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Introduction
Having served on the editorial board of The
Historical Journal since my sophomore year, it has
been an honor to work as the general editor for this
edition, the journal‘s tenth. Since its inception in
2002, the publication has strived to present the best
work from the department‘s variety of courses and
array of dedicated students, and this year is no
exception. The editorial board faced a great
challenge in narrowing the eighteen papers that
were submitted down to the four best that, along
with the winner of the Edwin T. Greninger‘41 Prize
in history, would be published. Many thanks to
Rachel Santose ‘11, Amelia Grabowski ‘13, Kaitlin
Reed ‘13, and Nathan Lanan ‘12 for their hard work
in selecting papers and working one on one with the
authors during the editing process.
Now to the papers themselves, which cover a
wide range of topics, span an array of time periods,
and focus on a variety of continents. First is Austin
Clark‘s “100 Spears Worth 100 Pieces”: The
Impact of Ashigaru on Sengoku Jidai, the winner of
the Greninger Prize. Austin examines the military
impact the ashigaru, or Japanese infantry, had on
the Sengoku period (sixteenth century). A shift in
importance from mounted samurai archers to these
foot soldiers, who were armed with spears or bows,
and related changes in discipline, training, and
technique, transformed the ways in which battles
during the period were fought and ultimately
allowed for the unification of Japan.
Cara Elliott‘s This House which I have built: The
Foundation of the Brattle Street Church in Boston
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and Transformations in Colonial
Congregationalism chronicles the foundation of the
Brattle Street Church by Thomas Brattle within its
historical and religious context. The church‘s
foundation marked the first of the divisions in
congregationalism in the late 1600s.
Brendan Quigley examines the role that Gallipoli
has played in world history in Gallipoli: The Spark
That Would Ignite an Empire. From the foundation
of the Ottoman Empire in the 1300s through World
War I, the peninsula has long been the focus of
leaders hoping to control the region.
In his well-argued capstone project The Master
of the Senate and the Presidential Hidden Hand:
Eisenhower, Johnson, and Power Dynamics in the
1950s, Samuel Cooper-Wall investigates the
changes that occurred in the relationship between
President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Senator
Lyndon B. Johnson, who served as Minority and
Majority Leader during Eisenhower‘s tenure. These
two men, on opposite sides of the political
spectrum, were originally able to compromise and
work somewhat in tandem in order to achieve their
goals. After a series of incidents, this cooperation
ceased, but the examination of their relationship
reveals a great deal about the ways in which these
two men behaved as leaders.
Robert Kellert‘s The Quiet War: Nazi Agents in
America tells a story that spans two continents. He
considers both German and U.S. intelligence
organizations during World War II and relates the
fascinating story of Operation PASTORIOUS, a
German intelligence maneuver within the U.S. that
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ultimately failed but had implications on the ways
in which the government treats enemies of the state
and traitors.
It is my privilege to present the Fall 2011 edition
of The Gettysburg College Historical Journal!
Elizabeth (Lisa) Ungmach ‘11
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Author and Editor Biographies
Elizabeth (Lisa) Ungemach ’11 is a senior History
major, Spanish minor from Wayne, NJ. Lisa has
served as a member of the board since her
sophomore year. After graduation, she plans to
spend the summer working in Musselman Library
and the following year engaged in service work
through AmeriCorps before enrolling in graduate
school for a dual degree in Library Science and
Public History.
Rachel Santose ’11 is a senior History major and
Civil War Era Studies minor from Broadview
Heights, Ohio. In addition to serving on the editorial
board of the Gettysburg Historical Journal, Rachel
is also the editor of the Gettysburg College Journal
of the Civil War Era. Next fall Rachel will begin a
dual Masters Degree program in History and
Library Science at Indiana University.
Amelia Grabowski ’13, a sophomore, is pursuing a
double major in English and History and a minor in
French. Beyond working with the Historical
Journal, Amelia also volunteers with the Center for
Public Service (CPS) and is a member of ALLIES.
She has been privileged to study abroad in Bath,
England, and plans to study in Paris, France next
year.
Katlin Reed ’13 is a sophomore History and
Spanish Literature double major from Lancaster,
Pennsylvania. She is interested in teaching English
as a second language or continuing her studies at a
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higher level after her career at Gettysburg College.
This is her first year with the Historical Journal and
she is looking forward to her future work with the
publication.
Nathan Lanan ’12 is a junior History/Classics
double major. He has always been fond of writing
and he received the Greninger Prize for a paper
written in his freshman year. His interests lie mainly
around the Mediterranean Sea from Ancient to
Medieval and Renaissance time periods, and his
focus is in the ground-level aspects of Military
History. He hails from Souderton, Pennsylvania
where he was active in his Church and earned the
rank of Eagle Scout in the Boy Scouts of America.
If all goes well, Nathan will eventually become a
writer of historical fiction while working as a Park
Ranger at one of America‘s many National Parks.
Austin Clark ’12 is a junior History major with a
special interest in military history. He is also an
amateur in the creative writing field and has spent
time in England studying both this and his history.
All things considered, though, there is no other
place he would rather be to learn and create than
Gettysburg, Pennsylvania.
Cara Elliott ’11 is a senior History and French
double major with an Economics minor. Apart from
her classes, she is also a writing tutor, an assistant to
the secretary of the French, Italian and German
departments, and a participant in a number of
different academic societies on-campus. Next year,
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she plans to attend the College of William and
Mary's MA/PhD program for history, with a focus
in the American Revolutionary Era.
Brendan Quigley ’11 is a senior History major,
film minor from Manasquan, New Jersey. He
studied abroad in Wollongong, Australia and ran
track at Gettysburg College all four years. Brendan
was a member of the shuttle hurdle team that set a
college record in 2008. After graduation he will
attend Monmouth University for a Masters in
Teaching in the hopes of one day becoming a high
school history teacher.
Samuel Cooper-Wall ’12 is a junior History major,
Civil War Era Studies minor from Kensington,
Maryland. He plans to pursue a career in public
history and has worked at the Eisenhower National
Historic Site in Gettysburg, the Nebraska State
Historical Society in Lincoln, Nebraska, as well as
other positions in government service.
Robert Kellert ’12 is a native of New Jersey and a
junior at Gettysburg College. He is currently
double-majoring in History and Philosophy, and
minoring in Classical Studies. In his spare time,
Robert enjoys golf, tennis, Jeopardy, movies,
computer games, pizza, and hero sandwiches. He
wishes to thank the History faculty for their support
and feedback, and their commitments both to
learning and teaching.
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“100 Spears Worth 100 Pieces”: The
Impact of Ashigaru on Sengoku Jidai1
Austin Clark
In the year 1545, during the latter half of
Japan‘s Sengoku Period or ―Age of Warring
States‖, the minor samurai Ukida Naoie was
assigned thirty men and a small fief in the province
of Bizen. His task was to cultivate and defend this
small corner of the province from the ambitious and
power-hungry lords and bandits that abounded in
the Sengoku Period, but Naoie set his sights higher.
Given direct control over his thirty men, a mere
garrison force of infantry, he used them to conquer
and rule over neighboring fiefs in the province. His
reputation and his army grew with each victory and
before long, Naoie controlled more than a tenth of
1

―The Seventeen-Article Injunction of Asakura
Toshikage, c. 1480,‖ in David J. Lu, ―From Civil Wars to
Unification,‖ in Japan: A Documentary History, 171-201
(London: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), 176.
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Bizen and over half of his original thirty men had
castles and fiefs to call their own. Naoie himself
ruled out of Okayama castle, which he had built for
himself, and kept a tight rein on his subordinates
through taxation and rotation of service. In 1577
Naoie, after taking over most of the neighboring
Matsuda lord‘s forts and province, stormed his own
lord‘s keep under flimsy pretenses and seized
control of the now expanded Bizen.2
Ukida Naoie‘s bloody and meteoritic rise to
power in the space of just thirty years was similar to
that of several, eventually more well known
daimyo, or Japanese feudal lords. Oda Nobunaga
especially would write a similar story, albeit on a
larger scale, expanding from his inherited Owari

2

John Whitney Hall, ―Foundations of the Modern
Japanese Daimyo,‖ The Journal of Asian Studies 20, No. 2
(May 1961): 323-325.
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province in south-central Japan to unite most of the
main Japanese island of Honshū.3 This move would
propel him into history as the first of Japan‘s great
unifiers, three individuals who would overcome
long odds to consolidate their power and pull Japan
out of the tumultuous Sengoku Period. The other
two, following almost immediately on the heels of
Nobunaga, were Toyotomi Hideyoshi and
Tokugawa Ieyasu, who would complete the
centralization of power and control set in motion by
their predecessor. Yet the enormous power and
influence this trio of unifiers wielded did not
materialize overnight and its genesis is somewhat
obscure, even if the legacy it left is not.
The turmoil of the Sengoku Period gave
birth to the centralized power Ukida Naoie would
3

Stephen Turnbull, The Samurai: A Military History,
(Surrey, England: Japan Library, 1996), 132-135.
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tinker with and all three of the unifiers would come
to enjoy. As a period of constant and chaotic
warfare, Sengoku stormed the walls of wellestablished tradition and forged quite literally in the
heat of battle a new dominant military force that
would shape the social order of the next 350 years
and give brilliant men like Nobunaga and Hideyoshi
the means to come to power. The localized nature of
the Sengoku Period fighting and the increasing role
of technology established the infantryman as the
decisive force on the battlefield, toppling the
mounted samurai out of dominance and giving the
ambitious daimyo who controlled them
unprecedented power. The leaders who recognized
this social shift and founded their influence in a
large corps of disciplined, professional infantry

10

would emerge victorious and found their shogunal
power in these ideas.
The dominance of infantry on the battlefield
by the end of the Sengoku Period was absolute. A
look at the muster rolls for the daimyo Gotō
Sumiharu in 1592, part of Hideyoshi‘s ill-fated
invasion of Korea, reveals that 90% of his force was
made up of infantry; out of 220 men only 27 were
samurai on horses.4 Takeda Shingen, a daimyo who
became known for his use of an exceptional amount
of cavalry, as well as his skill in using them, had a
ratio of approximately two infantrymen to every
horseman in his army. By 1590, when Hideyoshi
was firmly in control and just finishing his
unification of Japan, he ordered troops from the
Daté household and asked that they be supplied
4

Stephen Turnbull, Samurai Invasion: Japan’s
Korean War 1592-1598, (London: Cassell & Co, 2002), 44.
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with only thirty horses.5 At the battle of Sekigahara
in 1600, the battle in which Tokugawa Ieyasu
would take control of Japan from Hideyoshi‘s heir
and lead it into centuries of peace, about 85,000
men were involved on each side.6 Added together
170,000 men fought on the small plain at
Sekigahara, many times more than could be
mustered simply from the elite seven to eight
percent of a warrior society.
The meaning of the term ―Sengoku Period‖
itself speaks eloquently to the situation in which the
infantry suddenly found themselves prominent:
The aggregation of private
wars…became combined into a
simple struggle for survival with
5

Delmer M. Brown, ―The Impact of Firearms on
Japanese Warfare, 1543-98,‖ The Far Eastern Quarterly 7,
No. 3 (May, 1948): 244.
6
Michael Haskew, Christer Jorgensen, Chris McNab,
Eric Niderost and Rob S. Rice, Fighting Techniques of the
Oriental World AD 1200-1860: Equipment, Combat Skills and
Tactics (New York: St. Martin‘s Press, 2008), 164.
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rapidly changing alliances, triumphs
and disasters, that was to last for
over a century. Borrowing an
expression from the Chinese, the
years for 1490 to 1600 are called the
‗Sengoku-Jidai,‘ which is best
translated as ‗the Age of the Country
at War.‘ It was war on a scale vaster
and more terrible than Japan had yet
experienced.7
The ―war on a scale vaster and more
terrible‖ was, by and large, due to infantry
involvement. The reason is twofold. In 1568, while
the Sengoku infighting raged in many ways its
hottest, Japan had a population of a staggering 10
million people, spread over three main islands.8
These islands were, in turn, covered by mountains,
with geographically youthful bedrock peaks
covering 80% of Japan‘s surface. The remaining
portion was made up primarily of uniformly flat
7

Turnbull, The Samurai: A Military History, 116.
Conrad Totman, Early Modern Japan, (Berkley,
California: University of California Press, 1993), 11.
8
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lowlands, the three largest of which came to house
the majority of Japan‘s population.9 The
geographical closeness of the islands translated into
localized and dense fighting. The plain of
Kawanakajima, one of the few open plains nestled
between several mountain ranges and rivers,
witnessed no less than five battles between 1553
and 1564, strong testimony to how Japan‘s
geography influenced its wars.10
Historically, however, this influence had not
always held true. In past wars, Japanese armies
relied on the elite, mounted samurai horse archers
who would respond quickly to a threat across any

9

Ibid., 5.
Haskew, Jorgensen, McNab, Niderost and Rice,
Fighting Techniques of the Oriental World, 269.
10
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portion of the islands.11 The system had evolved out
of eight and ninth century conflicts with the Emishi,
the ―barbarians‖ who inhabited northern Japan,
when their light, mobile and hard hitting cavalry
wrecked one Japanese expedition after another.12
The tradition was further refined after the Mongol
invasions of the 1200‘s showed the need for less
cumbersome armor and the utility of the closecombat oriented spear or naginata.13 With the
coming of the Sengoku Period, the close, violent
fighting that resulted would dramatically change the
way the Japanese looked at war.
This closeness, when combined with Japan‘s
comparatively immense population, turned infantry
11

Arnold Blumberg, ―Between the 15th and early 17th
centuries, mounted samurai ruled Japan‘s battlefields,‖
Military History 28 (December 2004).
12
Paul Varley, Warriors of Japan as Portrayed in the
War Tales (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994), 3-5.
13
Haskew, Jorgensen, McNab, Niderost and Rice,
Fighting Techniques of the Oriental World, 91.
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into a natural and easily available fighting force.
Daimyo, the feudal Japanese lords whose constant
and varied bids for power perpetuated the civil war,
were ever vigilant for ways to gain the upper hand.
Japan‘s geography and large population made it
easy to recruit, concentrate, and fight with masses
of foot soldiers. Initially these ashigaru, literally
meaning ―light feet‖ because of their tendency to
loot the battlefields and towns in the manner of
more modern ―footpads,‖ were almost mercenary in
nature, fighting for the spoils they could steal and
having little loyalty, often drifting off to tend crops
or even to switch sides if the opportunities for
bounty looked more promising. To compound
issues, they were almost to a man poorly trained and
ill-disciplined, making their only real value the

16

numbers in which they were available.14 By the end
of the Sengoku Period, these issues would largely
be solved and the lowly ashigaru would change the
face of Japanese society, not only by virtue of their
numbers but of the increasing role of technology in
warfare.
The increases, improvements, and
innovations made in Japanese warfare technology
during the Sengoku Period were to have their most
profound effect on the infantry. Up until this time
weapons, armor, and technological advances
associated with war had been reserved exclusively
for the upper class and mounted samurai who were
doing the majority of the fighting. With infantry
rapidly becoming a major factor at the beginning of
the sixteenth century, it was only logical that those
14

Stephen Turnbull, Warriors of Medieval Japan,
(New York: Osprey Publishing, 2005), 84-85.

17

advances, and newer ones spurred on by the near
constant fighting, would be applied to them
eventually. These technological advances would
have the effect of not only making infantry more
and more of a force to be reckoned with on the
battlefield, but also of instilling a sense of discipline
and uniformity among the ―ashigaru‖.
Perhaps the best example for the creation of
uniformity and effectiveness among the ranks of
ashigaru is the evolution of their armor. The first
ashigaru simply brought whatever armor he owned,
often none, to the battlefield, and looted what more
he could take after the battle.15 As the century wore
on and more and more daimyo recognized the
impact their infantry were having on the battlefield,
they began to issue them what is known as okashi
15

Ibid., 85-86.
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gusoku, ―loan armor,‖ which consisted chiefly of a
breastplate (dô) and a short armored skirt
(kusazuri).16 This armor was fairly cheap and easy
to make thanks largely to changes brought on by
heavy campaigning, namely the simplification of
the lacing that held individual strips of armor
together. Typical Japanese armor of the time, such
as the dô, were made from overlapping strips of
iron, laced tightly together, that would provide
surprisingly great freedom of movement. As
demand became higher and campaigns lasted
longer, the lacing was loosened and more
strategically placed, making it both cheaper and
easier to tolerate on the march.17 It was the ashigaru
who benefited most from these changes, as daimyo

16

Haskew, Jorgensen, McNab, Niderost and Rice,
Fighting Techniques of the Oriental World, 40-41.
17
Turnbull, The Samurai: A Military History, 126.
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were more willing and able to provide volunteers
with suits of the reliable okashi gusoku.
While this minute example shows that the
daimyo were slowly beginning to care enough about
ashigaru to supply them, for good reason as will be
discussed later, it also meant that the daimyo
themselves had more control over the army and the
individual infantrymen. Armor issued by daimyo
was uniform in make and color and often had the
mon, or personal heraldry of the daimyo, painted
somewhere on it.18 Some leaders even went to the
extreme of having their entire force‘s armor and
weapons being a uniform color, such as Il
Naomasa‘s ―Red Devils,‖ who were clad entirely in
shades of red.19 While instances of this extreme are
uncommon, the uniformity of the issued armor
18
19

Turnbull, Warriors of Medieval Japan, 86.
Turnbull, The Samurai Sourcebook , 44.
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worked to unify and identify the army on the
battlefield. Armor played a key role in helping to
change the ashigaru from a scarcely armed rabble
to a uniform and identifiable fighting force, helping
to bring it together under the control of the daimyo.
The weapons of the ashigaru played a very
similar, but much more visible, role in establishing
discipline and making them a deadly force on the
battlefield. Often simple technological innovations
and regulations in weaponry had a massive
battlefield and social impact. For example, the yumi,
or the Japanese bow. Originally a weapon of the
elite samurai, horse archers par excellence even into
the Sengoku Period, the bow gradually found its
way into the hands the infantry for a variety of
reasons. Bitter military defeats in the Mongol
invasions had taught the Japanese the power of

21

massed bow-fire, where many hundreds of arrows
launched were more effective than single, well
aimed ones.20 This factor had been taken into
account before the Age of Warring States and the
first mention of ashigaru in Japanese history comes
out of the battles during the Nanbokuchō Wars in
the 14th century, where hundreds of shashu no
ashigaru, ―infantry shooters,‖ were employed.21
With the infantry becoming more numerous on the
battlefields of the Sengoku Period, it was only a
small step in logic to arm them with bows to
achieve powerful massed volleys.
It was these volleys that the yumi excelled at
delivering. Though it was initially a weapon of the
samurai, the bow was fairly easy to make and

20

Blumberg, ―Between the 15th and early 17th
centuries, mounted samurai ruled Japan‘s battlefields,‖ 78.
21
Turnbull, Warriors of Medieval Japan, 84.
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powerful, consisting of a strip of hardwood between
two strips of bamboo, held together and treated with
glue and a close binding.22 This layered
construction made them individually powerful
weapons, comparable to European longbows, and
were augmented by a staggering variety of arrows
made for any situation, from cutting armor to
emitting a shrill whistling noise used for signaling
and intimidation.23 Additionally, bows helped instill
discipline in the ashigaru due to the amount of skill
required to be an archer. Ashigaru chosen or
volunteering to be archers would necessarily
undergo periods of training, or help train other
ashigaru, which would give them a previously
unheard of amount of professionalism, a trend that

22

Haskew, Jorgensen, McNab, Niderost and Rice,
Fighting Techniques of the Oriental World, 50.
23
Turnbull, The Samurai: A Military History, 22.
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continued in the use of the arquebus. Putting bows
in the hands of the ashigaru also had the profound
effect of breaking down varying social boundaries.
After all, the bow had traditionally been the
exclusive province of the mounted samurai and
giving a weapon with such distinguished
connotations to the lower class is one prime
example as to how the battlefield was changing the
way the Japanese viewed their society.
Another important weapon in the
development of the ashigaru was the spear.
Consistently overlooked, not only in Japanese
military history, in favor gunpowder weapons and
flashier developments, the simple nagae yari had an
equally large impact on the use of infantry. For one,
it was cheaper and easier to use than almost any
other weapon, ideal for quickly arming large bodies

24

of men. And, above every other weapon, the spear
favors larger numbers of troops with little training,
as the basic use of the weapon is abundantly clear:
stick the sharp end into the enemy. As a result, most
Sengoku Period armies had a large percentage of
spearmen in their ranks, often as high as 70%.24
Armies of the Hōjō clan, who controlled the
powerful Kantō region, had spearmen regularly
make up 50% of their armies and Oda Nobunaga,
the first great unifier, led forces that comprised of at
least 27%.25
These two factors made spears integral to
the success not only of ashigaru, but to the daimyo
who led them. While in its basic conception the
spear is an easy weapon to use, spears favor their

24

Haskew, Jorgensen, McNab, Niderost and Rice,
Fighting Techniques of the Oriental World, 42.
25
Turnbull, Warriors of Medieval Japan, 103.
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wielders working in close formation and the
introduction of drill and discipline to the ranks of
spearmen in this regard would increase their
battlefield effectiveness many times over. The
Zōhyō Monogatari, a guide to infantry tactics
penned in 1649 by prominent samurai Matsudaira
Nobuoki, says of the ashigaru spearmen:
Unlike samurai spearmen, where
spears are thought of as only for
single combat, here many are of one
mind, with spear points moving
together, keeping a rhythm. When
one or two meet it is find to fight
individually, but when spears are
used en masse there must be
coordination and timing, with no
exception.26

26

―Zōhyō Monogatari,” in Turnbull, The Samurai
Sourcebook , 184. Note that the year, 1649, is almost half a
century after the end of Sengoku Jidai. The author is in a
unique position of observing the final outcome of Sengoku
Period ashigaru tactics and integration, yet the only real
firsthand experience he may have had would be helping put
down the Shimabara Rebellion a decade prior in 1638.

26

The fact that such a section was written
about spear drill and tactics after the Sengoku
Period speaks well to their developing effectiveness
during it. It should come as no surprise to find that
the first daimyo to introduce truly disciplined spear
units was Oda Nobunaga, who relied greatly on
them in most of his engagements and especially at
Nagashino, a battle more known for his use of the
arquebus.27 He made his spears uniformly longer
than any of his opponents (5.6 meters), a detail that,
when combined with his spearmen‘s superior
discipline, made his cheaply outfitted ashigaru a
true menace on the battlefield. This success set the
precedent for spear length becoming a major factor,
so much so that when the daimyo Hōjō Ujimasa
mustered hastily to defend his domain from
27

Turnbull, Warriors of Medieval Japan, 103.
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Toyotomi Hideyoshi, Nobunaga‘s successor, he
would decree ―a spear…is useless if it is shorter
than two ken (twelve feet).‖28
Yet the weapon to produce the most visible
and sweeping changes to infantry warfare was to be
the arquebus, an early handgun introduced by the
Portuguese during the Sengoku Period. Unlike the
bow and spear the arquebus had a host of initial
problems to contend with; the ammunition and
black powder it used could not yet be easily mass
produced and it had a cripplingly short range and
slow rate of fire compared to its yumi counterpart.29
However, the tremendous power of the arquebus,

28

―Compulsory Military Service Decreed by Hōjō
Ujimasa, 1587,‖ in David J. Lu, ―From Civil Wars to
Unification,‖ in Japan: A Documentary History, 171-201
(London: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), 186.
29
An experienced gunner could load, prime and fire
in about 15 seconds. However, most ashigaru would not be
experienced gunners and averaged around two to three shots a
minute. Turnbull, The Samurai Sourcebook, 137-138.
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commonly called a matchlock because of its system
of firing, outweighed these disadvantages. It fired
an 8mm caliber bullet, which could easily punch
through even the best made suit of armor, instantly
killing or maiming the wearer who would normally
be almost immune to bow fire.30 Such weakness
could also be mitigated by mixing bowmen into the
arquebus formations. Most often appearing in a
ratio of five archers to ten gunners, bowmen could
shoot faster than their cumbersomely armed
companions and thus maintain, to a reasonable
degree, the rate of fire of the handgun formation
while the arqubuses were bring reloaded. This
combination had become so effective and such
standard practice by the end of the Sengoku Period
that this integration was recommended in the Zōhyō
30

Ibid., 137.
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Monogatari, the previously mentioned guide to
using ashigaru.31 Given the power of the
matchlock, the means available to limit its
weaknesses, and its sheer efficacy, it is no surprise
that a general writing back to his province
requesting reinforcements during Hideyoshi‘s
invasion of Korea asked to ―have them bring as
many guns as possible, for no other equipment is
needed. Give strict orders that all men, even
samurai, carry guns.‖32
The arquebus had one key feature above its
ability to turn men quickly into soldiers through
ease of use and constant drill, in that it was usable
almost exclusively by infantry. With its lengthy
loading procedure, awkward size, and tremendous

31

Turnbull, Warriors of Medieval Japan, 129.
Brown, ―The Impact of Firearms on Japanese
Warfare, 1543-98,‖ 241.
32

30

recoil, the matchlock was not a weapon for the
mounted soldier. Thus, in order to take full
advantage of the potential of these weapons, as
many daimyo attempted to do, they had to rely on
infantry as their handgun arm. Given the large
proportion of infantry already in daimyo armies,
finding these men posed no significant problem, so
it was to the ashigaru that the matchlock conferred
its powerful battlefield advantages. It was
universally easier to use than a bow, which required
much practice and a large amount of natural skill to
fire accurately. Loading and firing a matchlock
could be taught in a day and steady drill could turn
men into professionals in the course of one
campaign season. Better yet, there was almost no
―skill,‖ per se, involved; the procedure was simply a
series of steps to push shot down the barrel, fill the
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pan with powder, and light the match to fire it,
presumably in the direction of the enemy. The need
for this constant drill also provided an easy means
to turn a rabble of unskilled men into a standing
army, working in tandem with the okashi gusoku
loan armor to instill in the previously footloose men
a sense of unit pride and an incentive to stay.
Despite its disadvantage of being expensive
and more difficult to produce, the arquebus began to
be fielded in increasing numbers, adding to their
effectiveness and slowly transforming Sengoku
Period fighting. Battles began to become large scale
maneuvers of infantry units rather than mad dashes
into the enemy line for a chance at glory. The nature
of the handgun and its battlefield use, concentrated
volleys using multiple lines of gunners to try and
keep up a steady fire, led the way in the concept and
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eventual creation of units of infantry, and even
cavalry.33 Soldiers would be grouped in large
formations depending on which sort of weapon they
held - bow, spear or arquebus - and used on the
battlefield in groups to try and gain a tactical
advantage. Perhaps no battle demonstrates this
tactic better than the one that propelled Oda
Nobunaga, the first of the great unifiers, to national
prominence: Nagashino.
The Battle of Nagashino itself is mostly
represented in history books, films, and art prints as
the slaughter of masses of samurai cavalry by the
humble but powerful arquebus. While the arquebus
certainly had a major role to play in the battle,
examination of the details reveal that it is more Oda
Nobunaga‘s consummate use of combined arms and
33
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dependence on infantry that won the day.
Nagashino was at once both a battle and a siege,
fought in 1575 outside the fortress of Nagashino
which the invading army of Takeda Katsuyori was
attempting to wrestle from the neighboring
Tokugawa control. Katsuyori was the son and heir
to the more famous Takeda Shingen, who was a
well known and much feared commander of
cavalry, of which he possessed a large amount,
especially during the infantry-conscious Sengoku
Jidai. He would pass both his skills as a leader and
his imperial ambitions onto his son, who, during the
Nagashino campaign, attempted to fulfill his
father‘s dream of capturing Kyoto. To do so he had
to go through the territories of Tokugawa Ieyasu,
the later shogun, and Oda Nobunaga, with whom he
had established a firm and mutually beneficial

34

alliance in the recent years. When Nagashino, a key
fortress in the Tokugawa interior, came under siege,
a desperate series of actions brought both the main
army of Ieyasu and a large relief force from
Nobunaga.34
The battle was set up along a series of
marshy and rolling ridges just out of sight of the
fortress of Nagashino, which was then under attack.
Katsuyori, upon hearing of the relief forces heading
towards the castle, decided to meet them in open
battle in order to use his cavalry, superior in both
training and numbers, most effectively. Nobunaga,
whose army made up the bulk of the relief force,
anticipated this move and drew up his army,
predominately infantry, accordingly.35 He knew the
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strength of handguns, having fought against them in
the hands of Buddhist monks and local alliances
known as ikki, and he planned to use these weapons
to their full potential.36
To help guard against Katsuyori‘s fearsome
cavalry, he created a running line of palisades
behind which he placed his and Ieyasu‘s 3,000
gunners. Each palisade intentionally fronted rough
terrain and was broken periodically every few
hundred feet, creating natural points of attack for
Katsuyori and an easy corridor of counterattack for
himself. As another precaution, and a sign of just
how much value he put on the arquebus troops, he
had his personal bodyguard, the most elite samurai
in the army, dismount and take control of the
separate matchlock units. This move not only
36
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strengthened the line, but gave the ashigaru an
enormous shot of discipline, making sure they
would keep courageous and steady. Behind this odd
mix of troops he held his spearmen and many
dismounted samurai to support or counter any
significant breakthrough Katsuyori might achieve.37
With these preparations made, he awaited the
Takeda onslaught.
At six o‘clock on the morning of June 28th,
Katsuyori dutifully gave the order to charge against
Nobunaga‘s line. The action was not as idiotic as it
sounds. The Takeda had four samurai to every three
of Nobunaga‘s gunners and though he was well
aware of the power of the handgun, having seen his
father use them in numerous siege operations, he
was counting on a rainstorm the night before to
37
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have rendered the powder and matches used for
firing them useless. Even if they had not been
turned into metal-augmented firewood by the
downpour, they would only be able to get off one
shot before his faster and more skilled mounted
samurai were on top of them. So that morning,
4,500 horsemen charged into the teeth of
Nobunaga‘s arquebuses.38
This charge was exactly what Nobunaga had
been expecting and, to a degree, hoping for. In
preparation, he had lined his gunners three ranks
deep, so once the first rank had discharged their
weapon, the second could step forwards and do so,
then step back and let the third do the same. By the
time the third rank had pulled the trigger, the first
rank would ideally have reloaded and would be
38
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ready to fire again. Nobunga had used this trick
before, with success, but had never implemented it
on such a scale. As it stood the tactic had the
desired effect, the ashigaru having kept their
powder and matches dry, and all Katsuyori could do
was watch in horror as three volleys in a previously
unbelievable succession tore his samurai apart. As
the morning progressed, however, the Takeda
managed to get to grips with Nobunaga‘s army,
especially once Katsuyori committed his infantry
and reserves, including his own personal guard.
Nobunaga‘s right flank in particular, which was not
protected by the palisade or any form of fence,
became the scene of close and bloody hand-to-hand
combat.39
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Hours later, Nobunaga gave the signal to fall
back to a second line of fences prepared at the same
time as the main palisades. Once disengaged,
Katsuyori began to move his army back to regroup
and possibly consider retreating. Nobunaga did not
give him a chance. Once it was clear the Takeda
were falling back, he had his samurai mount and
give pursuit, wreaking havoc on Katsuyori‘s
disorganized army. While Katsuyori and most of his
high command escaped, it became obvious by
nightfall that Nobunaga had carried the day. The
Takeda withdrew back into their home province.40
In light of such a brief description, it is easy
to see the temptation of writing Nagashino off as
being won solely by the use of firearms. As
mentioned before, an examination of the details
40
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reveals Nobunaga‘s genius in the use of combined
arms tactics and his recognition of the power of
infantry. If Nagashino had truly been a battle won
by firepower mowing down cavalry, it would not
have had several of the key features it did, such as
its grueling length, over eight hours, or any
prearranged fall back action by Nobunaga. Notably,
much of the decisive damage from a strategic
standpoint was done not by the gunners in the
opening hours, but by the mounted samurai and the
light-footed ashigaru during the twilight as they
systematically destroyed the Takeda rearguard and
large formations of panicked troops.41
If it was not the use of firearms that decided
the battle, then it was unquestionably Nobunaga‘s
previously stated genius at combined arms and
41
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dependence on infantry. Nobunaga was wise
enough to take into consideration most, if not all, of
the factors previously discussed in relation to
weaponry and dominance of infantry. He made sure
that his men were armed correctly and superiorly,
and also made sure there were more of them than
the enemy. Nobunaga‘s force on its own,
disregarding his Tokugawa allies, numbered 30,000
men, twice that of Katsuyori‘s army.42
Tactically, he took full advantage of the
infantry‘s capabilities and newfound flexibility.
Homogenization of units by weapon types allowed
him to deploy a strong front of purely arquebus
troops, supported by units more suited for close
combat, such as his well disciplined, effective, and
numerous ashigaru spearmen. Indeed, it was in
42
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these spearmen where a large portion of his
advantage lay. Accepting the fact that the Takeda
cavalry would probably reach his lines despite his
innovative use of handguns, he set up his line of
battle to give him an advantage wherever they broke
through. By creating gaps in a staggered line of
palisades, he effectively directed the focal point of
the Takeda charge, right into the waiting spear ends
of his ashigaru.
The flexibility and ease of control
specialization offered also allowed him to pull back,
replace, and redeploy units quickly, a characteristic
that proved invaluable when the samurai did
manage to force a hole in the line. Enemy cavalry
under Obata Masamori did at one point manage to
breach the line of palisades during a lull in the
firing, only to be bloodily repulsed as the gunners
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fell back to make room for the spearmen and
dismounted samurai to come up.43 Numerous other
breakthroughs were also repelled by the ability of
Nobunaga to set up a flank assault on the breaching
forces, thanks to the deadly combination of
ashigaru discipline, unit continuity, and the
staggered line of palisades. At the end of the day,
this flexibility also proved decisive as Nobunaga
was able to react almost instantly to the retreating
Takeda army, the disciplined and homogonous
makeup of the units allowing him to keep them
together and, in some instances, turn them on the
spot to pursue the enemy. He also successfully
employed his mounted samurai at this point,
unleashing speed, martial prowess, and hunger for
glory at just the right moment to make an impact.
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Nagashino is an excellent example of how
Nobunga‘s military power and political dominance
was derived from the infantry. With this newfound
emphasis on the ashigaru, the samurai suddenly
found themselves in a clumsy situation, one that
they would need to adapt to in order to survive.
Their inferiors were beginning to take over their
previous role, that of the protector and warrior of
Japan, and their superiors, their daimyo lords, were
beginning to strengthen their control over the
battlefield. The samurai, while the elite, were no
longer the sole arbiters on the field of battle. The
technological edge, discipline, and sheer numbers of
the ashigaru combined to reduce the mounted
samurai from the dominant military force to a mere
officer class over the course of the Sengoku Period,
diluting their claims to prestige and allowing the
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daimyo to control and benefit from war. The
samurai were forced into their new role by both
sides of the social scale, each side deriving its
power directly from the newfound dominance of the
infantry. From the bottom, smaller local samurai
would be able to gain power and retainers, unit
commanders, and even ashigaru would be able to
ascend the social ladder, redefining the role of the
samurai class as a whole. From the top, the need for
centralized control to use the power of the infantry
would give the daimyo unprecedented control over
the samurai, allowing these local lords, rather than
the warrior ideal of Japan, to take the proverbial
reins of Japan‘s future.
Samurai, especially during Sengoku, was by
no means a definite term. While it is typically, and
ideally, used to describe Japan‘s mounted archer
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elite who were responsible for defending the island
and winning personal glory on the battlefield, it
could describe any man from those who met this
ideal down to a simple village headmen, whose only
similarity to their heroic brethren was that they
served the same lord and could be called on for
military service. These lower samurai, called
village samurai or ji-samurai, would find
themselves in positions of unexpected power and
influence during the Sengoku Period.44 As de facto
leaders in their community due to their status and
comparative wealth, they became an important link
from the daimyo to the village, where most of the
recruits for infantry service were drawn from. In
return for their services mustering and organizing
44
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recruits the ji-samurai were in an ideal position not
only to lead on the battlefield, but to demand
privilege from their superiors in return for their
services.45
Thus, many of these lower samurai rose
rapidly in military rank and wealth, expanding the
ideas and sensibilities of the samurai class as a
whole. Not only did they very visibly lack horses,
an essential ingredient for the ideal samurai, but
they could be employed as unit leaders, whose role
was not to charge onto the field in search of glory,
but to stay with their men to coordinate them with
other units on the battlefield, interpret orders from
the daimyo, and ensure that they were kept under
control. Privilege and ascension in the samurai class
did not have to take the form of battlefield glory, or
45
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even anything to do with war. Often times the
rewards of the ji-samurai would be land, money, or
simply more duties to attend to. There was also the
distinct possibility of being promoted to a daimyo‘s
household or personal staff and retainers, great
honors not necessarily involving military duty. This
mobility started to distort the image of what a
samurai truly was, by having increasing numbers of
rising samurai occupying administrative or practical
jobs not necessarily on the battlefield or in pursuit
of personal honor. All these factors began to
change, from the bottom up, the way the samurai
functioned on the battlefield and, as a social group,
gave a new meaning to what it meant to be a
samurai.
In addition, promotion to the samurai rank
was not unheard of. Skilled or brave unit leaders,
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especially those of higher rank such as ashigaru
kashira (captain of ashigaru), had the very real
means to be promoted to samurai. This new status
was often designated by taking a surname and the
number of surnamed ashigaru kashira and ashigaru
ko gashira on many, particularly late, Sengoku
Period muster rolls and casualty lists indicates that
this practice, while perhaps exceptional, was far
from rare.46 These newer samurai would have much
the same effect as the ji-samurai on the definition of
the samurai class as a whole. With different
responsibilities, skills, and levels of wealth, the
newly promoted samurai would change the very
definition of the word. Samurai were no longer the
heroic ideal, charging out to meet the foe in
personal combat, relying on the bow and spear.
46
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They were now to be an officer class, a social rather
than warrior elite who helped the daimyo campaign
and command in battle, not win it on the strength of
their own arms. Nobunaga displayed at least a
temporary awareness of this fact at Nagashino,
notably when he appointed members of his own
bodyguard to command the arquebus gunners on the
front line. These samurai were, most likely to their
frustration, denied the opportunity to gain personal
glory or charge into the enemy, but in turn ruled the
ashigaru with an iron fist, keeping them disciplined,
steady and most importantly, close together, making
it easier to withstand the Takeda cavalry charge.
If the role of the samurai was being
squeezed and adapted from below by those rising
through the ranks, then it was also being redefined
from above, in some instances with no pretext of
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subtlety. This change came from the daimyo, the
lords whom the samurai served and were ostensibly
loyal to, and who were now making the most of the
Sengoku Period turmoil to improve their position.
Technically, they were samurai in and of
themselves as the shogunate was a military regime
and thus its officials were all of military rank, and
their official title of shugo-daimyo reflected this.
Historically, they exercised very little actual control
over battlefield events and acted more as a military
governor of their province, seeing that civil affairs
were carried out while the samurai warriors sought
renown on the battlefield.47 This idea began to
change with the onset of Sengoku Jidai, as daimyo
began to have a more invested interest in battlefield
happenings as the course of one battle could see
47
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them forced out of office, overthrown by retainers,
or suddenly propelled into prominence. Daimyo
thus began to exercise more control over individual
battles and the samurai below them though several
different means, almost all of which have their roots
in the predominance of the ashigaru.
Battles between samurai armies have often
been compared to battles in medieval Europe, where
the paradigm of a knight and his retainers on the
battlefield reigned supreme. Perhaps a more fitting
comparison is between the samurai and the
Homeric heroes of the Trojan War. Combat for
samurai was much more of a ritualized, individual
affair than a knightly charge, and the retainers and
rabble of infantry would, at the onset of a battle,
demurely keep back and let the two individual
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heroes fight it out for supremacy.48 This kind of
ritualized single combat is devoid of central control,
or indeed any real scheme for winning the battle,
making it difficult for a daimyo, with his renewed
interest in the fighting, to exert influence. The shift
of battlefield dominance to the infantry changed
this. As noted before, infantry armies were large
and worked best when segregated based on
weaponry, in effect creating different ―branches‖ of
the army and different units within those branches,
all of which needed some sort of central
coordination to work effectively. Samurai, with
their individualized combat routines and emphasis
on personal heroism, were in no position to take that
role. The daimyo, already nominally the head of
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state and the one man of power presumably more
interested in winning effectively than being first
into battle, was in an ideal position to assume the
mantle of command. The infantry, in effect, created
a need for centralized command and control, one
that allowed the daimyo, or anyone who felt like
seizing the title, to benefit greatly.
Once this basic relationship was established,
the daimyo could take steps to not only increase
their power, but also to rein in the samurai both
politically and militarily. With the coming of larger
and larger armies, one method of control adopted by
the daimyo was that of battlefield formations. While
they continued to evolve throughout the Sengoku
Period, the formations were almost universally
based on old Chinese concepts, with modification
for some distinctly Japanese features, such as the
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large body of arquebus troops.49 Two things are
exceptional about the battle formations: the
integration of infantry and the way in which they
facilitated centralized coordination. The first is
notable because battle formations were rarely
cavalry-centric and made good use of the
specialization, a feature almost exclusive to
infantry, to work and win the day. For example, the
koyaku (yoke) formation puts up a strong frontage
of gunners and archers supported by spearmen, with
a large force of dismounted samurai in an arrow
shaped reserve.50 The placement and overlap of
these units allowed them to provide mutual support,
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something only possible with the advent of the
specialized infantry unit.
The way in which they facilitated
centralized coordination is most important when the
daimyo‘s ability to control the battlefield is taken
into account. Not only did having every man in a set
place make setting up and executing predefined
maneuvers infinitely easier, but the amount of drill
and discipline that goes into being able to make
such formations work helps to turn the previously
footloose ashigaru into a loyal fighting force.51 It
also allowed for a good deal of battlefield control
over the samurai, who have been organized into
specialized units and made to follow orders, even if
it goes against their ideals. In the case of the koyaku
especially, the samurai are held in reserve and not
51
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in front of the formation, the place where any selfrespecting and competitive samurai hero should be!
This centralized power the infantry gave to
the daimyo also began to manifest itself in the
socio-political areas of Japanese life. Daimyo began
to exercise stricter control in the form of ―house
codes‖ and ―house precepts‖ aimed at governing
their domains, populace, and especially samurai.
Many of the articles in the codes are aimed
particularly at demolishing samurai battlefield
independence and putting them in a subordinate and
contained role. For example, Article 26 of the Yūki
House Code:
Article 26: Wherever it may be to, you must
not gallop forth as a lone rider without
receiving orders from the Yūki. But when
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summoned by the Yūki, you must not be
tardy.52
Or, even more strongly worded, Articles 67 and 72:
Article 67: To gallop forth
heedlessly and without thought
because you hear the sound of the
conch shell from the main fort that
signals taking to the field is quite
unpardonable. If the shell sounds,
you should go to a village and
quickly dispatch some underling or
servant to the main fort and have him
inquire into where you should go.
Only then should you gallop forth…
Article 72: Men of the horse units
should obviously not join an outside
group, nor should they join a
different group within the Yūki
house…The horse units should
always act in conjunction with ten or
twenty other riders and not mingle
with other groups.53
The daimyo here mean to rein in as best they
can the battle-eager samurai. Notice especially the
discouragement of riding out alone and the
52
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emphasis on staying within a unit. Both these
concepts helped the daimyo to exercise more
control over their subjects, who had previously been
dominant in the arts and strategy of war and may
not take kindly to being simply ordered into
formation. Using the ideas of honor that underlay
almost all codes created by feudal lords and the
samurai‘s strong virtue and ideal of loyalty, the
daimyo began to fundamentally change the
definition of the samurai class from above, even as
they sought greater control and power for
themselves. Just as they elevated ji-samurai and
unit commanders to dilute the image of the warrior
class, so to they also compressed them into elite
fighting units or put them in commands subordinate
to themselves on the battlefield. Being a samurai
during Sengoku Japan slowly began to mean being
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a member of the officer caste, one who was above
the foot soldiers and other members of the same
class, but who was ultimately subordinate to the
daimyo and certainly not in charge of his own
individual actions or glory on the battlefield.
It is worth reiterating that this power exerted
by the daimyo over the samurai was made possible
by the need for centralized control created by the
numbers, specialization, and increasing
professionalism of the infantry. The most prominent
and powerful daimyo did not construct their power
around a large base of mounted samurai supporters;
they instead made sure that their infantry were well
supplied, numerous, and under their direct control.
Oda Nobunaga, a man of previously recognized
military capacity, invested his money at the outset
of the military campaign season of 1549 not in
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samurai katana and horses, but in 500 matchlock
guns with which to equip his infantry.54 House
codes, in addition to keeping a tight hold on the
samurai, supported the arming of multiple
infantrymen over a single samurai, such as in the
famous article from Asakura Toshikage:
4. Do not excessively covet swords
made by famous masters. Even if
you own a sword or dagger worth
10,000 pieces, it can be overcome by
100 spears each worth 100 pieces.
Therefore, use the 10,000 pieces to
procure 100 spears, and arm 100
men with them. You can in this
manner defend yourself in time of
war.55
While this code was written early in the
Sengoku Period, it demonstrates that at least some
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daimyo grasped the importance of the ashigaru over
mounted samurai in maintaining their power. Once
the correlation between the infantryman and the
newfound military influence of the daimyo was
fully comprehended, they understandably took
measures to secure and solidify it. One previously
discussed method was through armor, the okashi
gusoku, ―loan armor,‖ which they could use to
standardize the quality and appearance of their
army. Another notable way of doing so, that also
conveniently undermined traditional samurai
power, was of direct recruitment of ashigaru from
the villages. Traditionally, samurai had been
required to bring men from the area which they
ruled, who were then loosely organized and
employed. By going straight to the source, so to
speak, the daimyo cut the samurai middleman out
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of the picture and increased his own influence over
the infantry units.56 This practice also had the sideeffect of increasing the importance of the ji-samurai
as mentioned earlier who, as a result of interest in
recruitment from their villages, had more contact
and political clout with their daimyo lords.
The man who perhaps best understood this
correlation and took the most dramatic steps to
protect it was Toyotomi Hideyoshi, the second great
unifier of Japan himself. Having come to power
after the death of Nobunaga, he proceeded during
the later decades of the 16th century to unify all of
Japan under his control through a series of military
and social maneuvers that rivaled Nobunaga‘s in
mastery. Even before he had conquered the entire
island, he refined and created an efficient standing
56
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army, which depended almost solely on him for its
supplies, arms, and equipment. He managed this
task by setting up centralized government storage
systems and military contracts, which made
virtually all those under his command rely on his
will in order to conduct military operations.57
His masterstrokes in securing power came,
however, in 1588 and 1591, when he issued two
separate, but mutually supportive, edicts that
changed the structure of Japan for well over two
and half centuries. 1588 saw the implementation of
the infamous ―Sword Hunt‖ Edict, which made it
forbidden for farmers ―to have in their possession
any swords, short swords, bows, spears, firearms, or

57

David J. Lu, ―From Civil Wars to Unification,‖ in
Japan: A Documentary History, 171-201 (London: M.E.
Sharpe, 1997), 173.

65

other types of weapons.‖58 The weapons collected
from this mass confiscation ostensibly went to the
creation of a gigantic statue of Buddha, but most
probably went into state armories to prepare for the
invasion of Korea launched in 1592.59 In one stroke,
Hideyoshi had essentially created a military class in
Japan. By disarming the farmers and commoners,
the only weapons left in the state were those
wielded by the soldiers in the standing armies,
which included previously recruited ashigaru. In
1591, the class realities that had developed because
of the Sword Hunt were solidified in law when
Hideyoshi issued the Separation Edict, which
decreed that any man attempting to leave his social
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class would be ―punished accordingly‖ and his
village or master could be ―regarded as committing
a culpable offense.‖60 By creating punishments for
leaving one‘s station in life, warrior, farmer,
commoner, or merchant, Hideyoshi in effect created
a government enforced class system, one that would
have huge ramifications for the ashigaru and the
samurai.
Since ashigaru were now locked into the
military, they officially formed a lower class of
samurai. Hideyoshi‘s edict had simply legalized
and solidified the system that had already been
developed: the assimilation of the ashigaru and, to a
degree, daimyo into the samurai class and the
accompanying redefinition. The term ―samurai‖
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now referred essentially to any fighting man rather
than the heroic ideal. What had developed
throughout the Sengoku Period was essentially a
larger warrior class with very real social mobility;
ashigaru could become unit leaders, unit leaders
could become samurai, and samurai could become
anything from the lord of a local province to a
daimyo. Having risen from the ranks himself,
though never having quite attained the samurai
class, Hideyoshi must have been fully aware of the
system that was developing and simply took the
dramatic step to implement it on a legal and
national level in order to protect his own power. He
would have little to worry about from upstart
samurai now that they had officially become an
officer class and only had the power to move up or
down in the system, rather than out through
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demonstrations of personal prowess on the
battlefield. Hideyoshi‘s rise and the power system
he left in place for the Tokugawa shoguns was
engendered and supported by the rising star of the
ashigaru footman. It simply took a leader, or
multiple leaders, who knew how to use them and
who recognized their power to truly change the face
of Japan.
St. Francis Xavier‘s simplistic observation
of them in 1550 was perhaps truer than any concept
the Japanese had of their own warriors at the time:
―They are excellent archers and fight on foot,
although there are horses in the country.‖61 As a
foreigner observing the warfare of Sengoku Jidai,
he picked up on two things quickly: the martial skill
61

―St. Francis Xavier‘s View of Japanese, c. 1550,‖
in David J. Lu, ―From Civil Wars to Unification,‖ in Japan: A
Documentary History, 171-201 (London: M.E. Sharpe, 1997),
198.
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of the Japanese and the prevalence of the ashigaru.
The use of horses is casually dismissed, something
it would take a great man of Japan another twenty
five years to even consider doing. Yet such a simple
observation cuts to the heart of it. It was the
infantryman, the lowly light-foot, who had the
power to change Japan. Geography and technology
conspired to put it into his hands and allowed able
leaders such as Oda Nobunaga to win decisive
victories with ingenious tactics. That same power
was lent to Toyotomi Hideyoshi who would bring to
a head all the change that had been over a century in
the making and would redefined not only what it
meant to be a samurai, but what it meant to be a
warrior in medieval Japan. As Asakura Sōteki wrote
in his house precepts ―call the warrior a dog, call
him a beast: winning is his business,‖ an attitude
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that would shape Japan and give the ashigaru the
necessary influence to do so.62

62

―House Precepts in the Sengoku Age,‖ in Sources
of Japanese Tradition, ed. Wm. Theodore De Bary, 2nd ed.,
vol. 1 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 428.
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This House which I have built: The
Foundation of the Brattle Street Church in
Boston and Transformations in Colonial
Congregationalism
Cara Elliott
―Their high object was to found a new Christian
Congregational church, upon the broad, catholic,
but conservative principles of Congregationalism –
a church in which a just liberty and privilege should
be allowed to all, and nothing imposed on any
individual.‖ 1
On December 24, 1699, a small gathering of
men and women met ―for public Worship in [their]
pleasant new-built house,‖ a simple wooden
structure in Brattle Close, a section of Boston near
the town dock.2 The newly appointed Reverend

1

Samuel Kirkland Lothrop, ―Sermon One, December
30, 1849,‖ A History of the Church in Brattle Street, Boston
(Boston: WM. Crosby and H.P. Nichols, 1851), 16.
2
Benjamin Colman, ―Records of the Church in
Brattle Square: Dr. Colman‘s Ministry, Lord‘s day, Decem.
24,‖ in The Manifesto Church: Records of the Church in
Brattle Square, Boston: With Lists of Communicants,
Baptisms, Marriages, and Funerals, 1699-1872, eds. Ellis
Loring Motte, Henry Fitch Jenks, and John Homans II
(Boston: The Benevolent Fraternity of Churches, 1902), 5;
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Benjamin Colman preached from Chronicles 2,
chapter vi, verse 18, ―But will God in very deed
dwell with men on the earth? Behold, heaven, and
the heaven of heavens, cannot contain thee; how
much less this house which I have built.‖3 This first
public meeting of the Brattle Street Church
occurred amidst a heated theological debate among
New England Congregational clergymen, which
began a year earlier when the foundation of the
church had first been conceived. Brattle Street‘s
foundation was in reaction to theological, political,
and cultural transformations that affected the whole
of New England in the latter half of the seventeenth
Samuel Adams Drake, Old Landmarks and Historic
Personages of Boston (Boston: James R. Osgood and
Company, 1873), 122; Thomas Brattle, Benjamin Davis, John
Mico, Thomas Cooper, and John Colman to Benjamin
Colman, May 10, 1699, in Samuel Kirkland Lothrop, A
History of the Church in Brattle Street, Boston (Boston: WM.
Crosby and H.P. Nichols, 1851), 45.
3
Colman, ―Lord‘s day, Decem. 24,‖ in Records of
the Church in Brattle Square, 5.
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century, all of which converged in the 1690s. While
the foundation of Brattle Street Church did not
make any radical departures from contemporary
theological consensus, its foundation did represent
the first concrete fragmentation of a theretofore
unified New England Congregational community.4
In this sense, the foundation of the Brattle Street
Church is representative of a radical development in
the evolution of colonial Congregationalism.
Brattle Street Church‘s foundation was not a
random occurrence. There were a number of
developments that caused its founders to establish a

4

Rick Kennedy, ―Thomas Brattle, MathematicianArchitect in the Transition of the New England Mind, 16901700,‖ Winterthur Portfolio 24, no. 4 (Winter 1989): 237 and
241 suggests that the ―liberalism‖ of the Brattle Street
founders, namely the mathematician-merchant Thomas
Brattle, has been exaggerated by the historical community.
This assertion is correct when viewing the founders from a
strictly theological or philosophical perspective. However, it
oversimplifies the contemporary contextualization of the
church‘s foundation.
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new congregation, beginning with the
Congregational Synod of 1662 and the adoption of
the ―Half-Way‖ covenant. The decision was made
in hopes of reversing flagging church membership
and loss of piety characteristic of the 1650s, in
which the church saw the Congregational Way –
John Winthrop‘s original ―City upon a Hill‖ churchstate observing the sovereign law of Sola Scriptura,
or scripture alone, – slipping through their fingers.5
As Patricia Bonomi notes, the clergy ―ever wary of
complacency, were prepared to reform church
practices . . . in ways that would command the
continuing allegiance of New Englanders to the

5

John Winthrop, ―A Modell of Christian Charity,‖ in
Francis J. Bremer, John Winthrop: America’s Forgotten
Founding Father (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003),
179; Harry S. Stout, The New England Soul: Preaching and
Religious Culture in Colonial New England (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1986), 59.
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Congregational Way.‖6 First suggested by Richard
Mather, a prominent Puritan clergyman at this time,
the covenant extended ―Half-Way‖ membership to
children whose parents were only ―outward‖ church
members baptized by the church. These parents had
not experienced the conversion moment followed
by the ―publick relation of experience‖ of that
conversion to the rest of the congregation – the
requirement for church members to become full
communicants in the Lord‘s Supper. The Half-Way
covenant stipulated that the children of these
baptized yet un-converted men and women could
also be baptized, a privilege previously reserved for
full members‘ children. In return, the parents were
to recognize the historical preeminence of the

6

Patricia Bonomi, Under the Cope of Heaven:
Religion, Society, and Politics in Colonial America (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2003), 68.
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church‘s faith and to promise to live according to
God‘s word.7 The theory was that by opening the
church doors slightly wider, more people could
come to hear God‘s word and would – inspired by
Congregational rhetoric – experience the conversion
moment, becoming full church members. The
ministry would thus be enabled to continue to
occupy its rightful place as spiritual leader and
shaper of state affairs.
The theological change generated by the
Half-Way covenant was not in itself extreme, but,
nevertheless, it spurred a contentious clerical
debate. Clergymen first asked whether the alteration
would cause a ―[dilution of] the purity of gathered
churches by introducing unregenerate members.‖8
Their second question was how wide the newly
7
8

Stout, The New England Soul, 58.
Ibid.
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cracked church doors should be opened. The first
debate was resolved relatively quickly, concluding
that the covenant would not dilute the purity of the
churches, and most New England churches accepted
the new covenant before the end of the seventeenth
century.9 The second debate continued without a
definitive answer into the first decades of the
eighteenth century.
In October 1684 a more widely applicable
and no less influential change occurred in colonial
New England. Edward Randolph, the colonial agent
to the British Lords of Trade, recommended that the
original Massachusetts Bay Charter be annulled.
This recommendation was based upon the premise
that New England settlers were acting contrary to
England‘s political and legal system, primarily due
9

Stout, The New England Soul, 61.
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to instances of religious intolerance during which
the British believed the colonists were being overly
extreme in their persecutions. A new royal charter
was formulated, incorporating the various New
England colonies into the ―Dominion of New
England‖ which was to be ruled by a crownappointed royal governor. Moreover, New England
was to be subject to English common law, including
religious toleration stipulated by England‘s 1689
Act of Toleration.10 In its first two years, New
Englanders essentially ignored the revocation of the
charter, as it did not cause significant societal
upheaval. In 1686, however, Sir Edmund Andros
replaced Joseph Dudley, a Massachusetts native, as
governor. Andros quickly began exercising his
powers to their highest extent, demanding the use of
10

Ibid., 111.
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Old South Church in Boston for Anglican purposes,
holding vice-admiralty courts to try colonialists‘
legal grievances, and seizing common lands in and
around Boston for his private use.11 It was not long
before the inherently independent New Englanders
began to chafe at the bonds imposed by their
arrogant new governor.
In April 1688, ―unconfirmed reports‖ that
James II had been deposed swept through Boston.
On April 19, 1688, armed with this knowledge,
townspeople assembled to arrest Governor Andros,
Edmund Randolph, and Joseph Dudley. An interim
government, the ―Committees for the Conservation
of Peace,‖ was subsequently established to fill the
gubernatorial void.12 While New England
clergymen celebrated along with the rest of the
11
12

Ibid., 112.
Stout, The New England Soul, 115.
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colonists, they also recognized that a working
relationship with their mother country was
necessary to the preservation of their civil and
religious liberties.13 After the rebellion, Reverend
Increase Mather traveled to England to explain the
motives behind the colonists‘ actions in order to
forestall any retribution and in hopes of regaining
the original charter. The trip was a qualified
success. In May of 1692, Increase Mather brought a
new royal charter back to Boston that established
Massachusetts, which was to encompass Maine and
Plymouth, as a royal province. As in the first
charter, the head of the government remained a
royal governor, but he was to work in tandem with a

13

Ibid., 116.
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legislative assembly elected by the landowning men
of the colony.14
The revocation of the Massachusetts Bay
Colony‘s original charter and the reactionary events
it sparked were watershed moments in New
England‘s history. Socially, the colonists had
discovered that it was within their abilities to
exercise their will and overthrow a governmental
body with which they were unhappy. Religiously,
once the revocation of the charter was finalized, it
symbolized the loss of the original covenant
between the New England colonies and God. This
covenant was believed to have been bequeathed to
the people by virtue of their adherence to Sola
Scriptura above all other codes of law and the
authority of the ―visible Saints‖ – fully converted
14

Ibid., 118.
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church members – within that state. But the new
royal charter had not undermined ―Pure worship‖
and deference to God‘s Word, and so came forth the
revelation that the national covenant was an
unnecessary component to the success of the
church-state.15 The belief in the absolute necessity
of the national covenant had changed, and certain
ministers would soon apply this reorientation to
other elements in the covenant-driven Puritan faith.
Moreover, the increased closeness between England
and her New England colonies would more
frequently expose the colonists to Anglican Church
practices, for which they would begin to show a
higher tolerance.16 Culturally, this same tightening
of bonds between mother country and her New

15
16

Stout, The New England Soul, 119.
Ibid., 128.
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England settlement saw the beginning of an era of
heightened exchange of ideas and customs.
In November 1680 and December to January
1681, astronomers around the world observed one
of the brightest comets of the century streak across
the celestial sphere. The astronomers recorded
meticulous observations and engaged in
conversations and debates regarding their findings.
For the most part, this scientific activity occurred in
Europe, such as among the London circles of Isaac
Newton and John Flamsteed, the royal astronomer.
But there was at least one circle in the ―wilderness‖
of the New England colonies that also observed the
comet. Thomas Brattle and his colleague John
Foster recorded their measurements and asserted the
hypothesis that the two comet sightings had been of
one comet that had passed around the sun and
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changed direction. From among the global body of
astronomers, only these two rural scientists and
John Flamsteed made this correct assumption.17 For
this astute conjecture, ―the observer in New
England‖ would receive a nod in Isaac Newton‘s
Mathematical Principles, ―the most scientific book
of the age.‖18 Thomas Brattle, mathematician,
scientist, merchant, Harvard professor, and one of
the foremost figures in New England‘s Age of
Enlightenment, would be among the most
instrumental founders of the Brattle Street Church.
With the establishment of the new royal
charter, the European Enlightenment, ―the cultural
force, transforming ideas about nature, design and
beauty . . . . the age of Newton, Locke, Addison,
17

Rick Kennedy, ―Thomas Brattle and the Scientific
Provincialism of New England, 1680-1713,‖ The New
England Quarterly 63, no. 4 (Dec., 1990): 587.
18
Ibid., 589.
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and Tillotson‖ came to New England. Thomas
Brattle had a close relationship with Europe and
developed his own mathematical and scientific
skills prior to the advent of the new charter and
New England‘s reception of the Enlightenment. 19
As the age of reason and rationalism gained force in
his native land, Thomas Brattle began to allow his
logical tendencies to permeate throughout other
aspects of his life. When in the small New England
community of Salem during the spring of 1692
witchcraft trial judges decreed that controversial
―spectral‖ evidence – evidence based upon visions
and dreams – was admissible for trial, thus sending
dozens of people to prison and the gallows, Thomas
Brattle penned a letter to a local divine in reaction
to the events. The letter, written on October 8, 1692,
19

Stout, The New England Soul, 128.
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epitomized Brattle‘s religious rationalism. The letter
quoted scripture and was steeped with religious
arguments, but it was also infused with Brattle‘s
―cool reason.‖ In admitting the disputed evidence
and fueling the hysteria based upon the testimony of
a few seemingly troubled young girls, Brattle
asserted ―that the Justices have thus far given ear to
the Devill, I think may be mathematically
demonstrated to any man of common sense.‖20
Moreover, he stated that the new legal precedents,
this ―Salem Philosophy . . . rather deserves the
name of Salem superstition and sorcery, and it is not
fitt to be named in a land of such light as NewEngland is.‖21

20

―Letter of Thomas Brattle, F.R.S. 1692,‖ in
Narratives of the Witchcraft Cases: 1648-1706, George
Lincoln Burr, ed. (New York: Charles Scribner‘s Sons, 1914),
182.
21
Ibid., 171-172.
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Thomas Brattle applied rationality to the
Salem trials – a contemporary legal dispute that had
a significant religious element. A few short years
after he wrote the 1692 letter, Brattle repeated the
doctrine of applying reason to religion. In 1698, he
and other like-minded men seized upon various
adaptations that had occurred in colonial society,
such as the Half-Way covenant, the revocation of
the charter, and the Enlightenment, to bring reason
and religion together in a new church, undertaking
the formation of the Brattle Street Church. 22 This
decision was that of liberal-minded, rational men,
attempting to be rational in the choice of their
22

Aside from Thomas Brattle, leading members of
the Brattle Street Church movement included Captain
Benjamin Davis, the merchant John Mico, Thomas Cooper,
and John Colman. These gentlemen wrote the original letter of
invitation to Benjamin Colman. Other men, including Thomas
Brattle‘s brother William, pastor at Cambridge, and later
Harvard President John Leverett, were also involved in the
foundation process. Most of these men were wealthy and well
educated. See Perry Miller, The New England Mind, 240-241.
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church and its practices. At the same time, these
men had no desire to be any less pious or
theologically secure than their peers. The founders
sent a letter of invitation on May 10, 1699 to their
prospective pastor, Benjamin Colman, a Boston
native who had been studying for four years in
England. Colman‘s background complemented the
founders‘ own sensibilities, making him fit for their
needs. Their letter informed Colman that the
founders had ―no design to depart from the doctrine
and order of the Gospel, or from the practice of the
churches of Christ in New England.‖23 They did
request, however, that ―[publick] relations should be
laid aside, and the Holy Scriptures publicly read in

23

Thomas Brattle, Benjamin Davis, John Mico,
Thomas Cooper, and John Colman to Benjamin Colman, May
10, 1699, in Lothrop, A History of Brattle Street, 46.
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the church.‖24 They also suggested that Colman be
ordained ―before [he came] over by some Nonconformist ministers in England‖25 so as to avoid
any controversy his ordination might arouse in
Boston.26
Colman received the founders‘ invitation in
Bath, England on July 19, 1699, along with letters
of encouragement from the Reverends Ebenezer
Pemberton and William Brattle, and other New
England inhabitants. After sending a letter of
agreement to the Boston ―undertakers,‖ Colman set
out for London, arriving on August 1, 1699. 27
Shortly thereafter, he was ordained by a number of
men belonging to the London Presbytery. The
24
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Reverend Colman then took his leave of England,
entering Boston on November 1, 1699.28 On
November 2, 1699, ―the Undertakers visited
[Colman] in a full Meeting at [his] Brothers
House.‖29 Less than three weeks subsequent to this
meeting, on November 17, 1699, ―A Manifesto or
Declaration, Set forth by the Undertakers of New
Church, Now Erected in Boston in New England‖
was published in Boston.30 The document does not
list a specific author, but it is likely that the release
of the document was discussed and agreed upon at
the November 2 meeting and that Benjamin

28

Colman, ―Boston in New England. December 12.
1699. A Church Book. Containing an Account, designed by the
help of GOD, of the Concerns & Votes of the Church, now
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December 12, 1699, in Records of the Brattle Street Church,
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29
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Colman, either solely or aided by the ―undertakers,‖
wrote the Manifesto. The purpose of releasing such
a document was ―for preventing all
Misapprehensions and Jealousies‖ in hopes that
publishing the church‘s ―Aims and Desires‖ would
put an end to the debates surrounding the subject of
its foundation.31
The sixteen-point declaration set forth, step
by step, the characteristics and practices of the new
church. First, the church stipulated that it adhered to
both the ―Confession of Faith put forth by the
Assembly of Divines at Westminster‖ and the
―known practice of many of the Churches of the
UNITED BRETHREN in London, and throughout
all England.‖32 As such, they believed it was
―suitable and convenient‖ to read the Holy Scripture
31
32
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Ibid.
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in public worship. The undertakers also asserted
that they would ―dare not refuse [Baptism] to any
Child offered to [them] by any professed Christian,
upon his engagement to see it Educated, if God give
life and ability, in the Christian religion‖ and would
allow the pastor to exercise ultimate authority over
these matters.33 The undertakers noted that the
pastor‘s power to baptize or admit members would
extend to the exclusion of those members, and
therefore gave the pastor the implicit ―consent and
concurrence of the Brethren‖ in matters of
―Suspending or Excommunicating an Offender.‖34
Regarding the Sacrament of the Lord‘s
Supper, the undertakers noted that ―as the
Ordinance is Holy, so the Partakers in it . . . . must

33
34
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―A Manifesto,‖ 3.
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be persons of visible Sanctity.‖35 Thus all who
desired to partake in the Supper were to be subject
to the pastor‘s inquiries regarding their ―knowledge
and Spiritual State.‖36 Yet unlike the rest of the
Boston congregations, they would ―assume not to
[themselves] to impose upon any a Publick
Relations of their Experiences.‖37 The Brethren, or
the full church members, might inquire into
potential communicants‘ ―life and conversation,‖
but such inquiries were to occur in private. The
authors then defined the concept of ―a particular
Church, as such, is a society of Christians by mutual
agreement, usually meeting together for Publick
Worship in the same place, and under the same
Ministry‖ in which society ―the Law of nature

35

Ibid., 2.
Ibid.
37
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dictates to [them], that there is implied a mutual
promise and engagement of being faithful to the
relations they bear to each other, whither as private
Christians, or as pastor and flock, so long as the
Providence of God continues them in those
relations.‖38 The Manifesto declared that its church
―could not confine the right of chusing a Minister to
the Male Communicants alone,‖ stating that the
church would instead allow ―every Baptized Adult
Person who contributes to the Maintenance [of the
church and pastor], [to] have a Vote in Electing.‖39
The Manifesto concluded by noting ―in some of
these particulars only, and in no other, do we see
cause to depart from what is ordinarily Professed
and Practised by the Churches of CHRIST here in

38
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New-England.‖40 Moreover, the founders asserted
that despite their departure, they still hoped ―to hold
Communion with the Churches here, as true
Churches.‖ The authors expected members of
Brattle Street to be received at other churches‘
communion tables and invited others to their own
table.41 Implications contrary to these statements
were ―most injurious‖ to the founders, since they
believed that the ways in which their practices
departed from the other churches‘ did not
undermine ―Evangelical Purity and Holiness in
[their] Communion.‖42
The Brattle Street Church departed from
traditional New England practices by extending
baptism to any child of a proclaimed Christian;

40
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dispensing with public relations of experiences by
potential communicants; reading Scripture without
interpretation in church services (a traditionally
Anglican practice); and bestowing the right of
participation to all contributing baptized persons in
church affairs, especially the in election of a pastor.
These innovations were not drastically different
from the system that was in place in the
Congregational community at large. Most New
England churches had already extended the
privilege of baptism to a larger group of children as
a result of the 1662 Half-Way covenant. The Brattle
Street Church was only pushing those cracked doors
all the way open. While the other transformations
did not follow as palpable a precedent as the
Synod‘s 1662 decision, neither were they without
prior models. In 1677, Solomon Stoddard, the
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pastor at Northampton, dispelled with barriers to
baptism or the communion table, ―identifying the
church not with a society of saints but with the town
meeting.‖43 In 1687, in The Safety of Appearing at
the Day of Judgment, he argued that the ―covenant‖
was not to be interpreted as a contractual
relationship between man and God, but as God‘s
command without any ability for men to
consciously commit to this relationship.44
Stoddard‘s changes had far-reaching implications,
but in the most immediate sense he undermined
both the covenant language and challenged
exclusion to communion. William Brattle, Thomas
Brattle‘s brother, was another controversial
minister. He preached from his Cambridge pulpit in
1697 ―the formal and public relations of candidates
43
44

Miller, The New England Mind, 227.
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might be dispensed with, that an examination by the
pastor and elders should suffice, and that the people
would signify their assent by silence.‖45 The Brattle
Street Church Manifesto prescribed exactly to
William Brattle‘s message – as Thomas Brattle‘s
brother, he was another influential member in its
foundation. While there was no contention in the
Brattle Street declaration that opened the
Communion table to all men, nor that directly
undermined the covenant, as Stoddard had done,
there were like elements in the Northampton
pastor‘s and the Brattle Street Manifesto‘s differing
amendments.46
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Miller, The New England Mind, 238-239.
The Brattle Street Church did not choose to
directly associate with Solomon Stoddard, nor would they
have listed him among those who had influenced their
Manifesto. Stoddard was surrounded by a wealth of
controversy; he was locked in a particularly contentious
debate with Increase Mather. It was not, therefore, ―politic‖ of
Brattle Street to align themselves with the Northampton
46
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What was inherently different between
William Brattle and Solomon Stoddard‘s models
and the foundation of the Brattle Street Church was
that neither William Brattle nor Solomon Stoddard
had established a new church based upon their
arguments. Theological debates in themselves had a
long-standing tradition in the New England colonies
– they fomented change and evolution and were a
key component in keeping the clergy alert and ready
to defend the faith. But renting the fabric of a New
England community by establishing a new and
separate church based upon debated disagreements
was a new and radical concept. Thus it was a
quixotic supposition that the Brattle Street
Manifesto would dispel any arguments against the

Pastor. While their theology is not at all the same, the
similarities in their final doctrines are undeniable. See Perry
Miller, The New England Mind, 232-244.
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church; if anything, the Manifesto fueled the
debates, which only became more caustic in the
following months.
On December 30, 1699, Salem Ministers
John Higginson and Nicholas Noyes, both revered
members of the New England Congregational
community, sent a letter ―To the Gentlemen, the
authors and owners of the Declaration,‖ the
undertakers of the Brattle Street Church.47 The letter
ungraciously ripped the Manifesto to shreds.
Beginning with a niggling jab at the word
―Manifesto‖ itself – the Salem men called it overly
imperious – the letter questioned each of the
Manifesto‘s innovations in a patronizing and

47
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19th, 1699,‖ in Lothrop, A History of Brattle Street, 28.
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mordant tone. Asserting that the Brattle Street
undertakers had not shown due deference to their
fellow church community leaders, the letter cried
―Sirs! How could you forsake the dear churches
some of you belonged to, whose breasts you had
sucked, and on whose knees you had been dandled,
without dropping one tear in your declaration?‖48 A
further claim was that the Brattle Street Manifesto‘s
omission of any explicit statement as to the
necessity of covenanting with God in a ―public and
personal giving up yourselves in Christ, according
to the Covenant of his grace‖ implied Brattle
Street‘s belief in its needlessness, to which
Higginson and Noyes took great offence.49 As to
those baptized by the church, Higginson and Noyes
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sneeringly remarked that soon enough any and all
children would be ―promiscuously baptized.‖50
The Salem pastors further pointed out that
the Manifesto endowed the Brattle Street Church
pastor with entirely too much power as was ―meet
to be put in any one man living.‖51 The Manifesto
had given the Brethren‘s implicit consent in all
matters of both admission and exclusion of church
members and had not mentioned the explicit need
for a ―consistory of elders.‖52 This concern was
compounded by the neglect of the Brattle Street
Church to seek the ―right of the fellowship of
neighboring churches,‖ thus implying Brattle
Street‘s belief in the dispensability of advice from
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neighboring pastors or elders. 53 Given this,
Higginson and Noyes contended that Brattle
Streeters had only mentioned their wish to be part
of the communion of churches in a desultory and
careless manner. When this misstep was added to
Brattle Street‘s definition of a church – which had
not included any mention of relative duties to God –
Higginson and Noyes counseled the Brattle Street
founders to refer to ―a little book (called ‗Spiritual
Milk for Boston Babes, drawn out of the Breasts of
both Testaments‘)‖ and to begin with the question
―‗What is the church?‘‖54 The Salem pastors also
found that the last article of the Manifesto, which
had bestowed upon all contributing baptized adults
53
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the right to participate in choosing their pastor, to be
frankly irresponsible. The Manifesto‘s language
implied that females would vote as well as males,
and since ―the females are certainly more than the
males . . . . the choice of ministers is put into their
hands.‖55 Even worse, in allowing the baptized
adult non-communicants‘ opinions to weigh with
equal measure to the communicants – whom the
non-communicants outnumbered – the noncommunicants would be in a position to wreak
havoc on the entire church system.56
Higginson and Noyes‘ last grievance was
unrelated to the content of the Manifesto. Rather,
they asked the Brattle Street community why they
had not informed the New England Congregational
community that there were certain common
55
56
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practices the founders found in need of reform
before choosing to set out alone. The pastors
chastised the Brattle Street founders; ―If you could
have convinced [the other churches] that [the
current practices] were evil, they would certainly
have [forsaken them], for they do not pretend
perfection in knowledge.‖57 This, then, was the
underlying problem that drove all the rest. The
theological liberalism of the Brattle Street Church
was ―offensive‖ to pastors such as John Higginson
and Nicholas Noyes, but what they truly could not
sanction was that Brattle Street had acted
unilaterally to enact those offensive practices. The
foundation of the Brattle Street Church had upset
the peace, and this the pastors could not forgive. At
the conclusion of their letter, Higginson and Noyes
57
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beseeched the Brattle Street undertakers to either
annul the Manifesto or to ―explain it to satisfaction,
by adjusting matters between yourselves and
neighboring elders and churches.‖58 The most
fundamental issue, and the one which demanded the
highest degree of gravity, was not the Brattle Street
Manifesto itself, but a restoration of peace and unity
to the New England Congregational body.
A few weeks before this letter had been sent,
at their December 12 meeting, the Brattle Street
Brethren voted that ―Mr. Colman present the
Desires of the Society to the Ministers of the Town
to keep a day of Prayer with [them].‖ 59 This day of
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prayer would act as the Boston ministry‘s official
recognition of Reverend Colman and the Brattle
Street church, finalizing Colman‘s installation as
minister. Reverend Colman sent letters of invitation
to the Boston Congregational Ministers shortly after
this meeting. ―Mr. Colman‖ – quite a disrespectful
way to address an ordained minister – received a
reply from Reverends Increase Mather and James
Allen on December 28, 1699. The terse note was
even less polite than had been the Higginson and
Noyes letter. The Salem pastors, at least, both
explained their reasoning and gave an alternate
option to revoking the Manifesto, albeit in a
supercilious tone. Mather and Allen, on the other
hand, stated that unless the Brattle Street Church

Erected & Settled in Brattle street, from the present date,‖
December 12, 1699, in Records of the Brattle Street Church,
5.
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were to ―lay aside‖ their Manifesto, the Boston
pastors could not join in communion or shared
prayer with the society. To do so would be
―interpreted as an approbation of those
miscarriages, which both before and since the
publication of the said Manifesto, it [seemed] to
them, [the Brattle Street community] had fallen
into.‖60 For all this bluster, the Boston ministers
came to an agreement within a month that ―the
forms of the Christian fellowship‖ would be
observed; it is likely that Reverends Samuel Sewall
and William Stoughton convinced the rest of the
local ministry to come to a consensus.61 Colman‘s
entry in the Brattle Street Church records for
January 31, 1700, reads ―Wednesday the 31. of
60
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January, was separated by us for public Imploring
the Presence of GOD with us, His pardon and
Blessing; & accordingly Solemnized.‖62 Peace was
seemingly restored. But the peace was shaky at best,
born out of necessity rather than agreement or
understanding.
In the spring of 1700, a long-standing debate
between Solomon Stoddard, the controversial
Northampton minister, and Increase Mather came to
a head. Rumor had it that Stoddard planned to send
a pamphlet to England in order to publish his
doctrine of worship. Mather wanted to publish a
sermon to undermine any Stoddard publication, but,
given certain parallels between Stoddard‘s doctrine
and that of the Brattle Street Church, it was likely
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that any sermon against Stoddard would be
interpreted as an insult to Colman and the Brattle
Street undertakers. In light of the recent peace, this
was an unfortunate externality, but Mather could
not allow Stoddard to proceed uncontested. In
March 1700, he published The Order of the
Gospel.63 Mather‘s scripture verses for the sermon
were from Jeremiah – ―I had planted thee a noble
vine, wholly a right seed – why gaddest thou about
so much to change thy way?‖ and Colossians –
―Joying and beholding your Order, - and the
Steadfastness of your Faith.‖64 In his introduction,
Mather cried, ―Is there no one that will stand up for
the Churches of Christ? The Good People in them
may then well think that their Watchmen are all
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either Dead or Asleep.‖65 Language such as this
combined with Mather‘s arguments directly against
such practices as had been enacted in Brattle Street
made a rebuttal by Benjamin Colman inevitable. 66
In November 1700, ―sundry Ministers‖ in
New England released in Boson Gospel Order
Revived, Being an Answer to a Book lately set forth
by the Reverend Mr. Increase Mather.‖67 This
sermon, though officially of anonymous authorship,
was undeniably Benjamin Colman‘s answer to
Increase Mather.68 Claiming to stand for ―Truth,
according to God‘s Word,‖ Colman proceeded to
pick apart each of Mather‘s arguments. 69 To
repudiate Mather‘s justifications for the necessity of
65
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potential church members‘ public relation of their
moments of conversion, Colman argued that the
practice was an institution of man rather than God –
it had no scriptural foundation. Moreover, Colman
asked, ―And with what face can we impose it, when
our Fathers fled from the impositions of men?‖70
Man did not have the authority to ―debate the
refusal from any Christian [the] privilege [of
membership]‖ and it was therefore peremptory of
any church body to require a public relation in order
to exclude certain persons from worship. 71 Colman
moved on to discuss the benefits of public reading
of scripture ―without explication or exhortation
there-with‖ in public worship, which Increase
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Mather had called ―Dumb Reading.‖72 While
Colman granted that congregants came to church to
hear ―the Word read with prejudice‖ as
communicated by God to the minister, and
thereafter transmitted by the minister in his
sermons, scripture was direct inspiration from God.
Thus the ―reading [of] God‘s Word in the great
Congregation, is . . . . the greatest Reverence and
Honour we can [show Him.]‖73
The next issue Colman addressed was
whether ―Baptism [was] to be administered to all
Children, whom any professing Christians shall
engage to so see educated in the Christian
Religion.‖74 Colman first dispelled with any
misconceptions that this definition meant to include
72
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either ―Papists‖ or any other of the ―grossest
Hereticks;‖75 professed Christians, rather, referred
to all those who ―profess their Faith in Christ, and
obedience to him.‖ If, then, papists and other
regenerates were not included in this group, Colman
professed disbelief that any ―conscientious
Minister‖ would not support the education of a child
in the Christian religion followed by an embrace of
that child into the flock.76 Colman then
communicated his defense for the participation of
both communicants and non-communicants in
choosing their pastor. Colman stated that ―the
administration of the Lord‘s Supper is but one
[aspect] of a Ministers work, and but a little part,
compared with all the rest . . . . [so] For some few to
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appoint who shall be the Preacher to whole
Congregation is as highly irrational.‖77
Colman was likely most concerned about
these four arguments. His new congregation had
explicitly and ardently affirmed these four practices
as the platform on which they stood and the reasons
for which they had founded the Brattle Street
Church. These arguments, however, were not the
only ones that Colman made in Gospel Order
Revived. Colman responded to each of the
contentions that Increase Mather had presented in
Order of the Gospel, many of which were not of
great concern to the Brattle Street Church. Mather‘s
plan had backfired. In releasing Order of the Gospel
as an argument against Solomon Stoddard‘s
disputed doctrines, he had broken a newly formed
77
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bond between himself and the Brattle Street
minister. In doing so, Mather unwittingly fomented
the circumstances by which another argument in
support of Solomon Stoddard reached Boston
audiences. Cotton Mather wrote bitterly that all the
recent publications, including Colman‘s, ―‗do sett
the People in a mighty Ferment. All the Adversaries
of the Churches lay their Heads together, as if by
Blasting of us, they hoped utterly to blow up all.‘‖78
Despite the 1700 debates, as the decade
gained steam, the dispute lost its heat. The Brattle
Street Church continued to be perceived as a liberal
Congregation, but the controversy surrounding the
supposed ―radicalism‖ of its practices faded into the
background as time marched on. Benjamin Colman,
while perhaps never as well respected as his
78
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ministerial contemporaries, had been officially
sanctioned. He and his flock were safe and stable.
Over the course of the decade, Colman participated
as an active member of the Boston Congregational
community. He preached multiple occasion-day
sermons, including one on the occasion of the
election of officers to the ―Honourable Artillery‖ in
1702 and various sermons presented to the General
Court and the Governor at Boston Lectures.79 And
in 1711, when the Old South Church meeting-house
was destroyed in the Great Fire of Boston, it was
with Brattle Street Church that they gathered for
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worship until May 1713.80 Peace, shaky at the
outset, had solidified, and unity had been restored.
But the fragmentation of the Congregational body
that the foundation of the Brattle Street Church
represented was not an isolated incident. Within just
a few decades, the Great Awakening, a period of
religious revival that occurred throughout the
American colonies from the 1730s to the 1760s,
would flood New England with passions,
enthusiasm, resentment, debates, and Old Light
versus New Light splits that would cause the Brattle
Street Church controversy to pale in comparison. It
cannot be said that the foundation of the Brattle
Street Church had any direct bearing in causing the
events of the Great Awakening to unfold.
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Simultaneously, the foundation of the Brattle Street
Church was the first instance when a
Congregational Church would take it upon itself to
break away from the established community of
churches and found a new house of worship based
upon contested ideas and practices. Moreover, both
in the societal transformations that inspired it and
the foundation itself, the church stood as one of the
first examples of New England‘s original ―City
upon a Hill‖ conception cracking. The church was
born in an era of theological debate and dissent that
the founders radicalized. The Brattle Street Church
founders reacted to their transforming society in
such a way as had not ever occurred before, but that
would be repeated many times thereafter.
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Gallipoli: The Spark That Would Ignite an
Empire
Brendan Quigley
The expansion and growth of the Ottoman
Empire in the early 1300s is one that has both
intrigued and puzzled Western scholars for many
years. Small bands of Islamic frontier raiders were
able to join together and ultimately become a
powerful empire that spanned three continents and
had subjects of many different religions, cultural
backgrounds and ethnicities. How did this happen?
What was the spark that ignited the wildfire that
would become the mighty and feared Ottoman
Empire? Looking back on Ottoman history, one
major acquisition, that is, the successful capture of a
peninsula known as Gallipoli or Gelibolu in the
Aegean Sea would give the Ottomans a permanent
foothold in Europe from which to launch their
121

forces into the Balkans and was responsible for the
amazing Ottoman expansion after 1300. The
strategic location of Gallipoli between Anatolia and
the Middle East and Europe has made Gallipoli one
of the most strategic locations within the Ottoman
Empire, serving as a gateway between continents.
History has proven that whichever nation has been
able to hold Gallipoli has been able to keep power
in the region.
In order to understand the significance of the
Gallipoli peninsula it is necessary to first look to the
beginnings of the Ottoman Empire. This empire
was able to emerge around the turn of the 14th
century in Anatolia by joining many independent
clans or ―states‖ that shared a common goal; to
expand the influence of Islam in the region. The
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once defining historical thesis on this significant
spark that would be the origins of the Ottoman
Empire was written by Paul Wittek in 1937. This
―Ghazi Thesis‖ proposed that it was the religious
zeal of Islam that drove many of these Turkish
raiders to spread across the Middle East and into
Europe, taking control of land and people in an
1

attempt to convert them to Islam. While this thesis
has been hotly debated for decades, one thing is
certain, and that is that these groups of raiders, for
whatever reason, did manage to expand from the
frontiers of Anatolia into the Middle East and Asia
as well as the Balkans of Europe, and Gallipoli
would become the main reason for the latter.
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The early years for this band of frontier
principalities were full of violence and bloodshed.
This small confederation of Islamist states struggled
to survive amongst several more powerful
neighbors including the Persians and Byzantines.
However, it was in these early years of the Ottoman
Empire (in the 1350s) that a wise Orhan Bey, the
son of Osman (creator of the Ottoman Empire),
noticed internal struggle within their close neighbor,
the Byzantine Empire, and decided to would take
advantage of the situation. In 1346 Orhan made an
alliance with John VI Cantacuzemus, a ―claimant‖
2

or ―pretender‖ to the Byzantine throne. To solidify
the alliance, Orhan married Cantacuzemus‘s
daughter, Theodora. This alliance put 6,000
2
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Ottoman troops in Byzantine territory to support the
rebel cause and gave Orhan an excuse to meddle in
3

Byzantine affairs. When Cantacuzemus called for
Ottoman support against the Serbs and Bulgarians
in 1352, Orhan quickly dispatched his troops to
Thrace, an outpost on the eastern side of Gallipoli,
leaving his son, Suleyman Pasha, in charge of all
Ottoman forces in the area. Suleyman‘s forces were
able to take Thrace, but instead of putting the land
back in Cantacuzemus‘s hands, Suleyman decided
to bring in more troops from Anatolia and lay siege
4

to the fortresses on the Gallipoli peninsula.

Although Cantacuzemus strongly insisted that
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Suleyman immediately retreat from Thrace and
Gallipoli, his protests fell on deaf Ottoman ears.

5

Although Suleyman had captured Thrace
and was able to replenish his forces with more
troops from Anatolia, his siege of the Gallipoli
fortresses was moving at a very slow rate. In a last
ditch attempt to regain lost Byzantine land in
Thrace, John VI Cantacuzemus offered to pay
Orhan to leave. Just as the Ottomans were about to
accept this deal the area was rocked with a violent
earthquake. It broke down the walls of several
fortresses on the Gallipoli peninsula and caused
major damage to the surrounding villages. While
the Christian defenders rushed out from their
devastated stronghold, Ottoman forces took control
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6

and quickly rebuilt what was destroyed. Again
Suleyman brought in more troops and supplies to
fortify his new outpost. This move sent shockwaves
throughout Europe, as calls for a Crusade began to
7

be heard throughout the continent.

Many historians look back on the taking of
Gallipoli as a major turning point in Ottoman
history. Halil Inalcik writes in his book, The
Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age 1300-1600,
that prior to the acquisition of Gallipoli the Ottoman
State was ―no more than one of many frontier
principalities,‖ and that ―the events after 1352 so
firmly established its superiority over others that
within 30 years they had become a tight knit and
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8

powerful empire.‖ Inalcik would also claim that
the conquest of Gallipoli was a ―crucial event‖ for
the Ottomans, as the Ottomans were able to ―gain a
foothold in the Balkans with the prospects of
9

limitless expansion towards the west.‖ The later
capture of Constantinople, as well as Ottoman
excursions into Serbia, Wallachia, Hungary,
Byzantium, and other Balkan lands would be the
direct result of the seizure of Gallipoli. Carter
Findley writes that the Ottomans were able to
expand because of their conquest and winning of
conquered societies as a direct result of their prime
location and stronghold in Gallipoli.10 This
peninsula provided a spring board for later Ottoman
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advances into Europe and, as long as the Ottomans
were able to keep control of it, they had a vital
lifeline from their homeland into Europe.
Also related to the success at Gallipoli was
Sultan Murad I‘s decision to move the Ottoman
capital from Bursa to Edirne. At the time Edirne
was located on the outskirts of Ottoman territory
and very close to ―hostile neighbors‖. Steve
Turnbull claims that this bold move clearly showed
that Murad believed he could and was about to
expand his empire, ―making his advance from a
firm base in the Gellibolu area.‖

11
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also notes that less than 20 years after Orhan was
able to win a foothold on Gallipoli the Byzantine
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Emperor, Jean V Paleologue made his submission
to his successor Murad I.

12

As the Christian powers became
increasingly worried about a growing Ottoman
Empire, plans were made to snatch Gallipoli back
from Ottoman hands. Although talks of a crusade
began to fester in Europe, they did not come to
fruition at this time and the only ruler to respond to
the request was the Byzantine Emperor‘s cousin,
Duke Amadeus VI of Savoy.

13

In 1366 Amadeus

was able to capture Gallipoli and immediately
14

returned it to the Byzantines.

This loss was a

major setback for the Ottomans, as they were
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effectively cut off from their conquered European
lands. Ottoman expansion westward came to a
grinding halt without the troops and supplies that
15

the Gallipoli lifeline provided.

While this time

was certainly a frantic and worried for Ottoman
leaders, Gallipoli would fall back into Ottoman
hands in 1376, thanks to an arrangement by Murad I
where he secured the Byzantine throne for
Adronicus IV in exchange for the vital peninsula.

16

From this trade it becomes apparent that
Gallipoli was important to the Ottomans and that
they knew it. As stated before it was certainly a
lifeline into the Balkans and would later be used as
a buffer to stop advancing armies and navies into
Ottoman lands. It is also important to note the
15
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importance of Gallipoli in a social sense. After
Suleyman took control of Gallipoli, and to a greater
extent when Murad I retained Gallipoli in 1376,
both Ottoman rulers began to strengthen this
―European stronghold‖ with Muslims from
Anatolia. The majority of Turkish civilians that
moved to this land were nomads, as it was believed
that they could easily transition and adapt to a new
17

Ottoman acquisition.

Turkish villages began to

spring up and establish a frontier that kept
expanding as more and more Turks settled in this
land. Although the Turks would have skirmishes
and battles in and around Gallipoli over the course
of the next 538 years, the area would never fall out
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of Ottoman hands, allowing a unique Turkish
culture to flourish.

18

Drawing a timeline backwards from the
many accomplishments of the Ottoman Empire, one
can see that Gallipoli is often where these
accomplishments originated. While this may be a
bold statement, many of the Ottoman advances,
including naval advances, came from the
springboard that was Gallipoli. Events that would
not seem associated with Gallipoli, upon further
inspection, turn out to be directly related to this vital
conquest. For example, Ottoman offenses against
the Byzantines in 1357 (which began in Gallipoli)
led to the capture of Adrianople. From the prisoners
of a captured Adrianople, Sultan Murad I created
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the first Janissary Corps.

19

In later years the

Janissaries would be used as the tip of the Ottoman
―spear,‖ becoming the first standing army and
replacing ―ghazi‖ tribal warriors. In later years the
Jannisaries would be key to winning many battles,
especially against John Hunyadi and the
Hungarians. If Murad was never able to capture
Adrianople using forces from Gallipoli, the idea of
the Janissaries might never have come to be
realized, and history would have been changed
forever.
Another pinnacle in Ottoman history was the
sacking of Constantinople, the capital of an aging
Byzantine Empire. While many nations, tribal
groups, and empires before the Ottomans had tried
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to capture the ancient city, all had failed. In 1453 a
young Sultan, Mehmet II, decided that he would try
his hand at doing what others before him had failed
to accomplish: conquering Constantinople. While
the defenses of Constantinople were impressive-they had managed to keep the capital in Byzantine
hands well after the fall of the Roman Empire-Mehmet II decided to attack the capital from both
land and sea, using a naval force that was assembled
at Gallipoli. Although initially unsuccessful in their
attack on a much smaller Venetian force, the
Ottoman navy was able to strike a blow to the
Byzantines after several vessels were carried over a
small patch of land into waters close to the city
20

walls.

As was the case in many Ottoman offenses
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of this period and future periods, Gallipoli was vital
in acquiring new lands and defeating Ottoman
enemies.
It is also important to understand the role
that the Ottoman navy played in Ottoman history.
After conquering the Byzantine Empire and
expanding Ottoman territory upwards to the
Mediterranean the Ottomans had traded one enemy
for a new one. This enemy was the Venetians of
present-day Italy. While the Ottomans were feared
for the skill of their armies, their navy at this point
was still relatively weak. The Venetians, boasting a
proud and very successful navy, had often fought
skirmishes with the Ottoman navy and, in an
attempt to destroy the Ottoman fleet, they attacked
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the naval base at Gallipoli in 1416.

Although the

Venetians were able to decimate the Ottoman navy
at Gallipoli, they could not overtake the Ottoman
fortresses or destroy the inner harbor naval base and
were forced to sign a treaty with Mehmet I to ―keep
the status quo.‖22 As would be the case with the
Ottoman navy for years to come, they were forced
to rebuild, but maintained power in the region.
Because the Turks were able to keep Gallipoli, they
could still keep their power in the region.
Although firmly in Ottoman possession,
Gallipoli seemed to be at the forefront of Byzantine
and Ottoman minds. As the halfway point (at least
until Ottoman control of Constantinople in 1453)
between Byzantine Europe and the Ottoman Middle
21
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East, whoever held this valuable land had a great
chance of keeping the other power in check. A
major scare for Ottoman forces immediately
followed Sultan Mehmet I‘s death in 1421, as
Mehmet‘s rebellious brother Mustafa agreed to cede
Gallipoli back to the Byzantines. Again the
Ottomans were in danger of losing their most
valuable staging ground and naval base. Mehmet‘s
young son, Murad, realized this and decided to fight
against his uncle using a loyal Janissary Corps.
Murad was able to defeat Mustafa, keep Gallipoli in
Ottoman hands, and regain lost Byzantine lands that
his father had fought so hard to obtain.

23

As the Ottoman Empire began to expand
past Gallipoli in the late 1400s it became less of

23

Ibid., 19.

138

buffer against the West but was still very important
to the empire in many other ways. During the late
1400s the Ottomans began a profitable trade
relationship with Florence, and used the port at
Gallipoli as a major trading center. This helped the
Ottoman economy to grow and prosper during this
24

time.

Gallipoli also became a major mill for

producing gunpowder for Ottoman guns during the
16th and 17th centuries, as its proximity to the
Aegean, Mediterranean and Black Sea allowed for
quick distribution to other Ottoman held territories.
It must also be noted that Gallipoli was the main
center for producing the cloth for the sails on ships
during the 16th and 17th century and the largest
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naval dockyard in the Ottoman Empire for well over
a century.

25

In understanding the importance of Gallipoli
as a naval base one must understand the
significance that the Ottomans put on their navy
starting with Mehmet II. Mehmet the Conqueror
understood that a powerful army would only
advance the Ottomans so far without the aid of a
strong navy. He learned this lesson battling smaller
numbers of Venetian ships and losing in the Siege
of Constantinople. In fact, many Sultans after
Mehmet attempted to strengthen their navy so that
they would be on par with or more powerful than
the navies of their adversaries. With this in mind the
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Ottoman leaders carefully chose the Governor of
Gallipoli, as he would become the commander of
the entire Ottoman Mediterranean fleet.

26

This post

became one of the most important in the entire
Ottoman Empire.

27

While the history of Gallipoli before the 20th
century shows how important this little peninsula
was to the creation and endurance of the Ottoman
Empire for over 500 years, this significance is often
overshadowed by the events that unfolded there in
the Great War, World War I. The Ottoman Empire
joined the war on the side of the Central Powers:
Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Bulgaria. Because
warfare had stalled and trench warfare resulted in a
stalemate, British and French forces decided in
26
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1914 and 1915 that they would attempt to end the
war quickly by defeating Turkey and adding a new
28

supply route to their ally, Russia.

The logical

location for attack fell upon the peninsula of
Gallipoli.
Despite the vital importance of Gallipoli, its
defenses fell into disrepair after years of inaction.
Only after Mahmut II‘s shock at a major Ottoman
loss at Konya did he attempt to strengthen his
29

defenses, including Gallipoli in 1837.

Viewing

the aging and obsolete fortresses falling apart after
the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913 again focus was
placed on improving Gallipoli but progress was
slow. By the time World War I broke out in 1914,
28
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the Ottomans were ―not ready‖ for war. In early
August of 1914 Gallipoli was ill equipped and
seriously lacking man power and weapons. Three
infantry divisions on the peninsula only made up
14,000 troops and 2,300 animals. After a quick rush
to resupply, troop numbers were up to 30,000 men
30

and 7,000 animals within months.

Even with these

preparations the land around the Dardanelles was
still weak from aging and obsolete fortifications. To
assist their allies, the Germans sent Admiral von
Usedom, an expert in sea costal defenses, as well as
500 German costal artillery and mine experts to
defend against a possible Allied attack.

31

The

Germans were also able to send limited supplies to
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the Ottomans through neutral Bulgaria and
Romania.
Hostilities against the Ottomans started in
November of 1914 with the British ―briefly‖
bombarding Turkish forts along the Dardanelles.
While damage was small, the British did succeed in
accelerating Turkish fortifications.

32

By early 1915

Gallipoli had added a further 6,000 soldiers, 263
more cannons as well as eight machine guns. In
1915 the 19th Infantry Division fell under the
command of a ―young‖ and ―aggressive‖ Colonel
Mustafa Kemal Bey, later to become the founder of
an independent Turkey.

33

This escalation of troops

and supplies shows that the Turks feared losing
Gallipoli, just as the Byzantines had 500 years
32
33
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before. Thanks to German 150 millimeter howitzer
cannons, the Turks at Gallipoli wreaked havoc on
34

British ships passing through the narrow straits.

Although taking significant damage from
Turkish defenses, the British Navy was able to deal
several major blows to the Ottomans, including a
battle in the winter of 1915 in which fortresses on
Kum Kale and Seddelbahir were completely
destroyed.

35

This victory gave the British a false

sense of hope, as their hopes that the Ottoman
defenders were weak and incompetent were correct.
As the British prepared for a major naval assault
against the Turkish defenses at Gallipoli and the
surrounding coastal lands, the Ottomans went to
work relaying mines and submarine nets and
34
35
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rebuilding destroyed defenses. Their strategy for
defeating the British and keeping a firm hold of
Gallipoli hindered on 3 main points:
1- Mobile howitzer cannons were to be used to
strike at an incoming fleet and stop any
minesweeping ships from taking the lead of
the incoming fleet.
2- Underwater mines and anti-submarine nets
would destroy ships too big to be destroyed
with howitzer cannons.
3- Improved costal defenses would deal with
any ships that made it through the first two
36
points.
The British and French naval assault finally came in
the spring of 1915, as the allied navies attempted to
punch through the Dardanelles into the Sea of
Marmara. At first the allied navy had success in
silencing a few forts, but heavy howitzer fire caused
damage and confusion amongst the European ships.
The assault was called off after three ships had
36
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146

quickly sunk as a result of hitting underwater mines
and three larger battleships were greatly damaged
from other mines. It was at this point that the
British realized they could not control the
Dardanelles with a naval force alone, and prepared
the armies of France, England, Australia, and New
Zealand for a ground offensive to destroy Ottoman
fortifications and troops in an attempt to capture
37

Gallipoli.

Thanks to minor British attacks and

invasion scares, Turkish troop readiness had
reached a high level prior to the Gallipoli
Campaign.

38

In describing the Gallipoli Campaign
historian Edward J. Erickson claims that it was a
coming of age for not only the Turks, but for
37
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Australians and New Zealanders as well: ―The
victory at Gallipoli was of huge physical and
psychological importance and is vividly
remembered in Turkey today.‖

39

It is often

remembered as a major and terrible disaster for the
allies, with an estimated 280,000 allied casualties
(44,000 deaths).

40

Adding insult to injury, British

and French naval forces entered the Gallipoli
straights knowing the Ottomans were low on
41

artillery ammunition.

A British Admiral even

went as far as to send a cable to Winston Churchill
before entering the Dardanelles, telling him to
―expect Allied forces in Istanbul within 14 days‖.42
This, of course, did not happen and, although
39
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Ottoman losses were also very heavy, Allied ground
forces were unable to make it past the Turkish lines
on the rocky and steep slopes of Gallipoli.
Turkish forces fought gallantly to defend
every inch of Gallipoli, as Colonel Mustafa Kemal
ordered his famous lines to his 19th Infantry
Regiment as they were running low on ammunition,
―I do not expect you to attack, I order you to die. In
the time which passes until we die, other troops and
commanders can come forward and take our
places.‖43 As allied forces could not make any
headway in taking control of Gallipoli, the order
was given to evacuate. British commanders
expected heavy Allied losses, as many troops were
dug in extremely close to the Ottoman enemy.
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However, the most successful Allied operation of
the entire Gallipoli Campaign was its retreat from
the peninsula. For all the bad planning and mistakes
that went into the initial invasion, not one man was
lost in the Allied retreat, as stealth, careful
maneuvering, and decoys such as machine guns
firing without operators (thanks to emptying
sandbags attached to triggers) allowed Allied troops
to escape unharmed. 44
The aftermath of the Gallipoli Campaign
was one of excitement and pride for the Turks.
They had defeated troops from Australia, New
Zealand, France, and Britain and stopped them from
taking over Ottoman territory, ultimately forcing the
allies to abandon their Turkish campaign. This

44
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victory also proved to the Turks that they could
stand up to Europe and support themselves,
something that they would remember when they
fought for their independence in the early 1920s.
Erickson sums up the feeling from a Turkish
perspective:
For the Turks the Gallipoli campaign evokes
the same kinds of memories as Gettysburg,
the Somme, Verdun, or Leningrad do for the
Americans, British, French, and Russians,
respectively. The campaign is also similarly
embedded in the psyche of the people of
Australia and New Zealand who continue to
celebrate Anzac Day.45
While it is true that Turks today remember the
Gallipoli campaign vividly, the same goes for
Australians and New Zealanders. One might ask
why such a terrible, costly, and embarrassing defeat
is still cherished in Australian and New Zealand
45
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minds, and it is because this conflict was the first
time that an independent Australia and New
Zealand were involved in any conflict as their own
sovereign power. Although a disaster, these
countrymen are very proud of their ancestor‘s
sacrifice, something that is visible every April 25th,
ANZAC Day.
In conclusion, the strategic location of
Gallipoli between the Middle East and Europe had
made Gallipoli one of the most important places
within the Ottoman Empire. Whichever group
claimed control over Gallipoli, whether it be the
Greeks, the Byzantines, or the Ottomans, often had
control over the region and could exert their
influence into adjacent lands. Because the Ottomans
were able to gain control of Gallipoli, through
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cunning and help from Mother Nature, they were
able to expand their empire into Europe, grow at a
very fast rate, and ultimately rise to become a very
powerful and dominant empire. Keeping control of
Gallipoli was central to maintaining power,
something the Ottomans knew very well, as they
successfully defended the land from the Byantines,
Serbs, Hungarians, Venetians, and much later the
combined forces of the British, French, New
Zealanders, and Australians.
The successful defense of Gallipoli in World
War I also helped propel Mustafa Kemal, the future
founder of Turkey as an independent country, to an
icon status. Although Allied forces in World War I
were unsuccessful in capturing Gallipoli, the
experience was none the less important to the
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cultural psyche of Australia, New Zealand, and
Turkey. Mustafa Kemal accurately described the
feeling between all nations involved in the Gallipoli
campaign with these words in 1934:
Those heroes that shed their blood and lost
their lives, you are now lying in the soil of a
friendly country. Therefore rest in peace.
There is no difference between the Johnnies
and the Mehmets to us where they lie side
by side here in this country of ours. You, the
mothers, who sent their sons from far away
countries, wipe away your tears; your sons
are now lying in our bosom and are in peace.
After having lost their lives on this land they
have become our sons as well.46
In the end, Gallipoli proved to be one of the most
important – if not the most important – Ottoman
held territory in its storied existence. Since
regaining the land in 1377, it has stayed firmly in
Turkish hands under the Ottomans and later the
46
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Republic of Turkey, where it remains today.
Although there have not been any major battles in
Gallipoli in many years, the Turks still stand ready,
knowing that this gateway between Europe and the
Middle East is still a sought after commodity.
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The Master of the Senate and the
Presidential Hidden Hand: Eisenhower,
Johnson, and Power Dynamics in the 1950s
by Samuel J. Cooper-Wall
In March of 2010, renowned architect Frank
Gehry unveiled his design for a memorial to Dwight
D. Eisenhower in Washington, D.C. Centered
around an elaborate layout of stone blocks running
along a city-block of Maryland Avenue is the
featured aspect of Gehry‘s design: a narrative
tapestry of scenes from Eisenhower‘s life. Over
seven stories tall, the tapestry will impede the view
of the building located directly behind it. That
building is the Department of Education, named for
Lyndon Johnson.1 Decades after two of the greatest
political titans of the twentieth century had passed
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Philip Kennicott, ―A New Wrinkle: Gehry‘s
Eisenhower Memorial is Bold but not Curvy,‖ The
Washington Post, March 26, 2010, C1.

156

away, their legacies were still in competition. In
many ways, then, it is fitting that, as a great
monument will be laid for Dwight Eisenhower in
the nation‘s capitol, scholars have begun
reassessing him as a leader and a president. One
aspect of his presidency that has needed to be
reevaluated is his fascinating relationship with
Johnson. They came from different political parties
and had different visions for America, yet there was
a time when circumstances bound them in a
meaningful, though unstable, political dynamic. For
six years of his presidency, the moderate
Republican Eisenhower had to work constructively
with a Congress dominated by Democrats in order
to get his agenda passed. As Majority Leader of the
United States Senate during this period, Johnson
saw an opportunity to raise the standing of the
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Democratic Party and his own ambitions for the
presidency by aligning himself with, and
occasionally undermining, President Eisenhower.
Although neither man fully achieved his goals in
this partnership, it nevertheless proved fruitful for
both. Their interaction sheds light on them as
individuals and leaders. Further, a closer inspection
of many legislative triumphs previously credited to
Johnson actually contained the artful influence of
President Eisenhower, proving his political prowess
applied to Johnson and the legislative process.
Paths to Power and Finding Common Ground
In many ways, the dynamic between these
two men took shape at their very first meeting. Two
weeks after Nazi Germany surrendered to the allies,
Texas Congressman Lyndon B. Johnson received
permission to take one of his small subcommittees
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to Europe. Although his travel was under the guise
of making an evaluation about how the U.S. Navy
could help support a strong postwar defense effort,
Johnson was most anxious to view conditions on the
ground in Europe in order to enhance his credentials
for taking part in postwar planning. Although
Commanding General Dwight D. Eisenhower‘s
staff complained about the timing of Johnson‘s
visit, Eisenhower himself nevertheless charmed
Johnson and his colleagues by briefing them about
conditions in Europe. He also instructed his aides to
allow Johnson‘s delegation to go wherever they
desired and to ensure that they had ―a very pleasant
and wonderful visit.‖2 Johnson benefitted politically
from the visit, while Eisenhower dutifully and
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quietly satisfied any obligation he had to those
public servants. Although neither man could have
realized it at the time, this encounter foreshadowed
a future relationship.
Seven years later Johnson and Eisenhower were
reunited in the political realm. The election of 1952
saw Eisenhower win the presidency with the largest
margin of victory since the landslides of Franklin D.
Roosevelt. His popularity, dating to World War II,
made him a political star. The Republicans also
regained a two-seat majority in the Senate. One of
the Democratic casualties that year was Majority
Leader Ernest McFarland of Arizona. McFarland‘s
defeat meant his assistant leader, Lyndon Johnson,
who had only been in the Senate for four years, was
now the highest ranking man in the Democratic
caucus. Despite his inexperience, Johnson began
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campaigning among his colleagues to be the new
Minority Leader for the 1953 session of Congress.
With the support of influential Georgia Senator
Richard Russell, Johnson got the job; though, at that
time, there was little competition for the leadership
of Senate Democrats.3 The last two occupants of the
position had been defeated for reelection while
trying to defend the increasingly unpopular policies
of President Harry S. Truman. However, Johnson
sensed a new opportunity with a popular
Republican now in the White House: if Democrats
could align themselves with Eisenhower wherever
possible, they stood to benefit from his massive
appeal - an approach seemingly verified by the
Democratic triumphs in the 1954 midterm elections,
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which made Johnson Senate Majority Leader.4 As a
result of this mindset, Johnson took pride in

4

Robert A. Caro, The Years of Lyndon Johnson:
Master of the Senate (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2002),
521. Interestingly, Eisenhower during this time was extending
his political influence across the country, even to Lyndon
Johnson‘s own reelection campaign. The Texas Republican
Party, led by Jack Porter, Johnson‘s opponent in 1948, was
seeking a candidate capable of using Eisenhower‘s coattails to
overpower the Democratic leader, a strategy Eisenhower
applauded and encouraged. See Dallek, Lone Star Rising, 439.
The President, though, did not take an active role in the
campaign, but behind-the-scenes he ordered executive
agencies to ―step up expenditures to stimulate industrial
activity‖ in hopes that might make a difference by the time of
the election. By October, though, polls showed the
Republicans were vulnerable, so Eisenhower undertook a tenthousand mile campaign tour. Along the way, Eisenhower
declared that if the Democrats retook control of Congress,
they would start ―a Cold War of partisan politics.‖ See Dallek,
Lone Star Rising, 460. Johnson and House Democratic Leader
Sam Rayburn took offense, sending the President a telegram
calling his remarks an ―unjust attack on the many Democrats
who have done so much to cooperate with him and the
Administration and to defend his program from attacks by
members and leaders of his own party.‖ They also declared
that, as far as they were concerned, no partisan war would
occur if the Democrats retook control of Congress and that
they would continue to support an ―enlightened foreign policy
against the Republican reactionaries . . .‖ See Lyndon B.
Johnson and Samuel Rayburn to Dwight D. Eisenhower, 9
October 1954, White House Central File, Alphabetical Series,
Box 1599, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library.
Regardless of whatever their motives were, Johnson and
Rayburn did have a point. And this telegram was not the only
example of Johnson trying to prove his intentions and abilities
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supporting aspects of Eisenhower‘s agenda,
especially foreign policy.5 One example was

to the President; during a 1957 breakfast meeting with
Eisenhower, Johnson presented him with papers which
demonstrated that the current 85th Congressional session had
spent far more time in session and passed more legislation
compared to the Republican-controlled 83rd Congress.
Eisenhower‘s secretary, Ann Whitman, noted in a
memorandum on the matter that ―The Senator is sensitive,
apparently, in this respect.‖ See Ann C. Whitman,
Memorandum of Appointment, 26 August 1957, Ann
Whitman File, Ann Whitman Diary Series, Box 9, Dwight D.
Eisenhower Presidential Library.
5
In 1965, Johnson recounted his intentions towards
Eisenhower to the newly elected House of Representatives
Republican leader, Gerald Ford. Johnson said he told
Eisenhower, ―Mr. President, when I agree with you, I‘ll come
tell you. I‘ll disagree with you with dignity and decency, and I
won‘t talk about your dog or your boy. But I‘ll try to offer an
alternative . . .‖ Later in his conversation with Ford, Johnson
claimed to have never had a quarrelsome word with
Eisenhower for six years. While Johnson romanticized his
relationship with Eisenhower, this attitude reflected Johnson‘s
desire for a partnership. See Michael Beschloss, Reaching for
Glory: Lyndon Johnson’s Secret White House Tapes (New
York: Simon & Schuster, 2001), 165. In his conversations
with Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, there is strong
evidence of Johnson‘s desire to cooperate. The two met on
occasion and extended great courtesy to each other as they
exchanged ideas, prompting Dulles to write the President after
one such chat, ―I had a very gratifying talk with Lyndon
Johnson. He came to see me just prior to leaving for Europe
this afternoon. It was not only marked by great personal
warmth but a sincere desire to help find a way to get bipartisan
backing for our foreign policies.‖ Dulles went on to reiterate
Johnson‘s assurance that if the administration would cooperate
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Johnson‘s quick approval of a measure granting
Eisenhower full authority to use the U.S. Armed
Forces in 1955 to defend Taiwanese islands around
Formosa from Chinese air attacks.6 Later, following
the 1956 election, foreign policy returned as a
forefront issue during the Suez Crisis, as Britain and
France launched an assault on the Egyptian military
on the Sinai Peninsula and the Suez Canal. On
November 9, 1956, Eisenhower arranged to have
Congressional leaders briefed about conditions on
the Sinai, in hopes this would help get approval for
proposals which increased the chief executive‘s
authority to handle the American response to the
and counsel with himself and Democratic Senate Whip Mike
Mansfield, he was confident Eisenhower‘s policies would be
supported by most of the Democratic caucus. See John Foster
Dulles to Dwight D. Eisenhower, 13 November 1956, Ann
Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series, Box 8, DDEL.
6
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crisis. Eisenhower‘s plan worked perfectly, as
Johnson found the briefing ―very fruitful and
helpful‖ and promised he would not play politics
with foreign policy. By meeting face-to-face with
Democrats, Eisenhower assured Johnson and other
Senators that he was firmly in control of the
situation.7 Johnson also supported Eisenhower‘s
―open skies‖ proposal, calling the plan for the
superpowers to be able to fly over each other‘s
nations to observe nuclear armament facilities an
―imaginative stroke.‖ Johnson further recommended
an ―open curtain‖ policy, which encouraged the free
movement of people and ideas between the
communist and democratic areas of the world
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without being subjected to suspicion.8 Soon after, as
Johnson lay in a hospital recovering from his first
heart attack, Eisenhower thanked him for this
support, writing, ―Thank you ever so much. I am
greatly pleased by what you had to say. I do hope
you are rapidly improving.‖9 This gracious and
respectful tone found in their early correspondence
was symbolic of their meaningful efforts to
cooperate on critical foreign policy issues in the
first years of the Eisenhower Administration.
Johnson‘s alignment with the President was
necessitated by the latter‘s obvious popularity, still
strong even a decade after World War II ended. As
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long as Eisenhower was doing well in the polls,
Johnson was likely to support him. As Eisenhower‘s
reelection approached in 1956, Johnson‘s support
for the President was remarkably nonpartisan in
nature. In fact, Johnson was careful to avoid
criticizing the President, because, as Doris Kearns
wrote, ―Johnson felt that to attack Eisenhower
would be ‗like telling children that their father was
a bad man . . . ‘‖10 Johnson took specific action to
appease the President, including allocating an
additional five million dollars for the Overseas
Information Program after Eisenhower placed a call
to him on the matter in May of 1956.11 With such
action, Johnson‘s standing with Eisenhower grew.
10
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As the campaign of 1956 neared, Eisenhower even
believed the Democrats might nominate Johnson to
run against him. In his memoirs, Eisenhower
observed that Johnson would have ―. . . had better
vote-getting power‖ than the actual nominee, Adlai
Stevenson.12 For his part, Johnson viewed the
President‘s reelection as inevitable. Sid Richardson
reported to Eisenhower on November 8th that
Johnson had told him that ―The President is going
to carry Texas . . . and I am going to continue to
work with him.‖13 Eisenhower not only carried
Texas, but won in a landslide greater than that of his
first campaign. However, the close cooperation
between the two politicians had already reached its
12
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apex. Johnson‘s biographer Robert Dallek explained
that in Eisenhower‘s second term, ―Johnson was
reluctant to abandon the bipartisanship that he
believed had served the country and congressional
Democrats during Ike‘s first term. But pressure
from liberals, a defense of congressional
prerogatives, and genuine differences over Middle
East policy pushed him into a conflict with Ike,‖
and the result was Johnson‘s allegiance to
Eisenhower waning over the rest of the decade.14
For the Democratic leader, this strategy appeared
quite wise, but what he had failed to anticipate, and
what some scholars have failed to grasp, was how
Eisenhower in turn used Johnson to his own
political advantage.
Eisenhower‘s Approach to Johnson and Congress
14
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In order to more fully understand this
dynamic, historiographical conclusions must be
analyzed and reevaluated. Chief among them is the
perception of President Eisenhower as ―. . . an aging
hero who reigned more than he ruled and lacked the
energy, motivation, and political know-how to have
a significant impact on events.‖15 Originally the
view of cynical liberals in the 1950s, it had made its
way into early historical analysis of Eisenhower and
public perception about the President. Modern
scholars, such as Fred Greenstein, have discovered
that Eisenhower was a far more devious and clever
strategist than his critics had assumed. In fact, he
employed a shrewd ―hidden-hand‖ methodology
which concealed a great deal of his leadership
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initiatives while enabling him room to maneuver
within the political system.16 Akin to many aspects
of his presidency, Eisenhower‘s interactions with
Congress typically invoked a philosophy derived
from this hidden-hand style of leadership. It was a
multi-faceted approach that, interestingly enough,
had a similar concept as that of an extensive study
written by Democratic attorney James Rowe for

16

Ibid., 5-6. Yet, while the ―hidden-hand‖ strategy
proved effective for Eisenhower, it also allowed for others to
portray him as a weak leader. Lyndon Johnson, on the
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Known as the ―master of the Senate,‖ Johnson‘s leadership
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wrangle support. His biographer Robert Caro wrote, ―He used
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elemental brutality.‖ Caro, The Years of Lyndon Johnson, xxi.
Eisenhower, though, saw through the Senate Democratic
leader. Eisenhower‘s friend William E. Robinson remembered
the President, while watching the 1960 Democratic
Convention, saying of Johnson, ―He is a small man. He hasn‘t
got the depth of mind nor the breadth of vision to carry great
responsibility. Any floor leader of a Senate majority party
looks good, no matter how incompetent he may be. Johnson is
superficial and opportunistic.‖ Greenstein, The Hidden-Hand
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Harry Truman after the Republican Party won both
houses of Congress in the 1946 midterm elections.
Rowe‘s report ended up in Eisenhower‘s White
House files after Truman left office, though there is
no evidence that Eisenhower himself ever read it.
That said, many of Rowe‘s recommendations were
also part of Eisenhower‘s strategy and it serves as a
valuable lens for further examining the tactics of
President Eisenhower.
Rowe laid out historical precedents for his
conclusions concerning the success of Presidential
dealings with Congress. He noted that Presidents
such as Grover Cleveland and William Howard Taft
tended not to vocally berate Congressional
opposition, since this kind of behavior often harmed
the President and his reputation more than his

172

targets.17 Eisenhower avoided such confrontations
by limiting his criticism of Congress in public.
Rarely did an intense disagreement between
Eisenhower and Johnson become news or public
knowledge. Eisenhower‘s kindness and diplomacy
shown in many interactions with Johnson certainly
signaled a legitimate feeling that the President
preferred Johnson as a friend, not an enemy.18 This
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173

attitude was very much unlike Herbert Hoover, for
example, who became so ―publicly argumentative‖
with Congress that it approved little of his agenda.
To ease or prevent tension, Rowe viewed personal
meetings with opposition leaders as significant
gestures toward cooperation. Indeed, scheduling
records indicate that Eisenhower occasionally
breakfasted with the Senate Democratic leader and
regularly invited Johnson and House Speaker Sam
Rayburn to private evening meetings at the White
House. Rowe also recommended that the President
should ―act and speak at all times in terms of public
welfare and not as partisan.‖19 The Congress would
be more likely to support the President whenever he
has popular support on his side. According to Rowe,

the same cub, so to speak.‖ See Wilton B. Persons Oral
History, OH #334, DDEL.
19
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―The history of every administration shows that in
the final analysis a President has but one weapon:
public opinion.‖20 Eisenhower was accustomed to
this practice as well, partially because he knew his
intentions far better than those of many
Congressmen. As Eisenhower once confided to
friend Edward ―Swede‖ Hazlett, ―In the general
case each [member of Congress] thinks of himself
as intensely patriotic; but it does not take the
average member long to conclude that his first duty
to his country is to get himself re-elected.‖21
Eisenhower accused Johnson and others of such
pettiness, but was fortunate that he himself had a
degree of popularity which left little doubt to his
reelection. Although he was never able to bring
20
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Republican majorities back into either house
following their loss of power in the 1954 midterms,
Eisenhower proved capable of working with
Johnson and the Democratic Congress.
Another significant method Eisenhower
employed specifically on Johnson was the use of
intermediaries. Some were congressional allies,
who kept tabs on the Senate Democratic leader.
This was one assignment in which Republican
leader William Knowland, who did not often hold
the confidence of the President, was particularly
useful. With his desk on the Senate floor right
across the center aisle from Johnson, Knowland was
ideally situated to be able to gather some
information to pass along to Eisenhower, including
a possible rift between Johnson and his mentor,
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Sam Rayburn, in 1957.22 Two specific men, though,
managed the job best. In the early days of the
presidency, the primary go-between was Sid
Richardson. The Texas millionaire made his fortune
in oil, and he and Eisenhower had been friends for
over twenty years. He also was a financial
contributor to both the President and Johnson,
making him the ideal person to discreetly handle
Johnson on Eisenhower‘s behalf. Eisenhower, with
counsel from Treasury Secretary George
Humphrey, used Richardson to encourage Johnson
to support the administration‘s policy wherever
possible. In one instance Eisenhower had a hand in
plans to suggest Richardson threaten support for a
primary election challenge to Johnson from Texas
Governor Allen Shivers in 1954 unless the
22
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Democratic leader got on board with certain
Eisenhower policies.23
After Richardson‘s death in 1959,
Eisenhower‘s second Treasury Secretary, Robert
Anderson, another Texan, stepped in to the role.
When reflecting on this experience in a letter to
Johnson several months after Eisenhower‘s death,
Anderson recalled that this liaison was established
―. . . on the basis of preserving completely the
[Democratic] party integrity and the absolute right
of dissent, but so that we did not confront either the
Administration or the Congressional leadership with
surprise suggestions which might not be in our
national interest either politically or economically.‖
Anderson also remembered that the information
23
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discussed by the President or Johnson with him
would be kept confidential from the cabinet, though
he did reserve the right to report anything Johnson
told him to Eisenhower. Lastly, Anderson
nostalgically noted the ―free exchange‖ of ideas
between them, and how their relationship was much
stronger than future presidents with Congressional
leaders, including John Kennedy‘s relationship with
Everett Dirksen, Johnson‘s with Dirksen (in the
1960s), or Nixon‘s with Congressional Democrats
in the early 1970s. Although Anderson may have
idealized the Eisenhower-Johnson relationship as he
wrote to his fellow Texan so many years after the
fact, he was certainly in a position to see the
cordiality and respect the two showed for each
other.24
24
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The use of intermediaries was a creative
tactic on Eisenhower‘s part, but probably even more
effective were his more personal meetings with
Johnson, an approach highlighted in the Rowe
Report. Even when the Democrats were the
minority party in Congress, Eisenhower invited
Johnson and Rayburn to the White House to talk
policy and politics over drinks and light
refreshments. The three were comfortable talking
with each other in this setting and were able to bond
over the fact that they were all born Texans (though
Eisenhower was raised in Kansas).25 Most
importantly, these meetings surely allowed
March 1970, Anderson Papers, Box 344, DDEL. Anderson
also would periodically write summaries for Eisenhower about
Johnson‘s political stances on certain issues for the President‘s
use, even against other Democrats such as Richard Russell.
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Eisenhower to get a better sense of Johnson‘s
persona and character, and thus allowing him to
more easily take the pulse of his so-called ―loyal
opposition‖ in Congress.26
Overall, these tactics proved essential for
Eisenhower over the six year period in which the
President and the powerful Majority Leader worked
to guide the legislative process. Johnson was
obsessed with public approval and press attention.
Eisenhower understood Johnson‘s motives in this
regard, and privately referred to the Democratic

26
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leader as a ―phony.‖27 Eisenhower also displayed no
inclination to trust Johnson, as the Majority Leader
clearly wanted Eisenhower‘s job and would employ
devious political strategies to get it. Yet, no matter
the degree to which Eisenhower detested Johnson‘s
―superficial and opportunistic‖ qualities, the
President was aware of his own popularity and how
this could be used as leverage over the Senate
leader.28 It was also clear to Eisenhower that he
would need the help of Democrats to pass his
agenda, which was not conservative enough to suit
the Taft wing of the Republican Party. To achieve
Democratic support, Eisenhower treated Johnson
with great respect, even placing him on five-person

27
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committee which would be tasked with determining
his (Eisenhower‘s) own fitness to continue in office
should his health severely deteriorate or if an
ailment, such as a stroke, limited his mental
capacities.29
Eisenhower‘s tactics, right down to his
efforts to accommodate Johnson‘s ego, as well as
his incredible patience which the Democratic
leader, showed how effective the President was at
managing and even manipulating what could have
been a bitter adversary into a respectful opponent
and a partial ally. And while his tactics were
inventive if not brilliant, comparatively few
scholars have assessed Eisenhower‘s subtle role in

29
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the crucial legislative issues of the day. As a result,
the stereotype of Eisenhower as a passive president
persists. To better understand Eisenhower and
Johnson‘s relationship and comparative powers, a
more complete picture is required. Several
significant case studies, ranging throughout the
Presidency, serve to enhance Eisenhower‘s true role
in this dynamic. Taken together, they represent each
man‘s strengths and power.
Early Cooperation and the Emergence of
Eisenhower‘s Leadership Abilities
―We are in the minority,‖ Johnson told the
Senate Democratic Conference after assuming the
party leadership in early 1953, adding ―I have never
agreed with the statement that it is ‗the business of
the opposition to oppose.‘ I do not believe the
American people have sent us here merely to
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obstruct.‖30 Knowing full well that it was not in his
own best interest to make an enemy in Eisenhower,
Johnson supported the President where practicable.
Johnson moved quickly to extend the olive branch
to Eisenhower by accepting the nominees for the
Presidential cabinet, declaring ―I am anxious to
cooperate with the President in carrying out his
mandate. Unless there is a violation of some
important principle, I believe the President should
have around him the men he has selected.‖31 One of
the most contentious nominees needed Johnson‘s
help the most. Eisenhower had selected Charles
―Chip‖ Bohlen to be Ambassador to the Soviet
Union in April 1953. Bohlen was a career diplomat
30
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with experience in dealing with the Soviets, but
anticommunist maverick Senator Joseph R.
McCarthy vehemently opposed Bohlen‘s
confirmation because the latter had taken part in the
Yalta Conference, which had yielded sections of
Germany and the city of Berlin to Soviet influence.
In addition, McCarthy implied that Bohlen was as a
homosexual and demanded access to Bohlen‘s FBI
file.32 Eisenhower denied McCarthy access to the
file but allowed it to be reviewed by Senate
Majority Leader Robert Taft, who found in it
nothing worthy of disqualifying Bohlen. On the
Senate floor Johnson defended Bohlen, and accused
McCarthy and his supporters of questioning the
integrity of President Eisenhower. With support
from Johnson and the Democrats, Bohlen was
32
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confirmed in a 74 to 13 vote. As a result, Johnson
knew he and the Democrats benefitted from this
issue while the Republicans seemed divided. Not
for the last time, Johnson got good press and
Eisenhower got what he wanted out of the Senate.33
A Common Enemy: Right-Wing Senators
At the beginning of the 1953 session of
Congress, conservative Ohio Senator John Bricker
offered an amendment limiting the President‘s
power to conduct foreign affairs by granting
authority to Congress to approve international
compacts and treaties and by restricting the
President from making any treaty which violated
the Constitution. Eisenhower did not feel that such
an amendment was truly necessary, but saw nothing
wrong with its premise, which was ―. . . a
reaffirmation of the supremacy of our Constitution
33
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and the right of Congress, under the Constitution, to
annul by subsequent act of its own any provision of
any treaty.‖34 However, the President made clear he
thought the language of the Bricker Amendment
tied the president‘s hands and ―. . . would be notice
to our friends as well as our enemies abroad that our
country intends to withdraw from its leadership in
world affairs . . . It would impair our hopes and
plans for peace and for the successful achievement
of the important international matters now under
discussion.‖35 Bricker‘s proposal appeared to be
subtly criticizing the United Nations by declaring
that it would not permit international organizations
from controlling or adjudicating the rights of
34
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American citizens.36 Eisenhower and Attorney
General Herbert Brownell tried to convince Bricker
to delay the Senate‘s consideration of his proposal,
but Bricker introduced it anyway, and signed on
sixty-three other senators as cosponsors. In turn,
Eisenhower worked with Republican leader
William Knowland to introduce what was called the
Knowland Substitute for the Bricker Amendment.
Essentially, though, this was Eisenhower‘s
counterproposal, simply reaffirming the Senate‘s
ability to ratify all foreign treaties.37
However, Lyndon Johnson soon managed to
develop a more popular alternative to Bricker.
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Johnson considered the Bricker Amendment an
insult to former Democratic Presidents Roosevelt
and Truman, not to mention an impediment if he
himself ever became president. Yet, he was also
under a great deal of pressure because most
southern Democrats supported Bricker, as did Sid
Richardson.38 Johnson, in this case, showed his
political cunning by meeting with Secretary of State
John Foster Dulles, and asking Dulles to convince
Eisenhower to publicly denounce Bricker‘s
Amendment.39 Most importantly, though, Johnson
38
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convinced Democratic Senator Walter George to
propose a more moderate alternative to Bricker‘s
measure. George‘s motion dictated that
international treaties could not become law if they
violated the Constitution, and all United Nations
Charters and Executive agreements (but not formal
treaties) required approval by Congress. Johnson,
though, wanted the George Resolution to fail as
well, but by a closer and more respectable margin.
Johnson hoped the George Resolution would draw
some conservatives from Bricker and, if George
failed, he hoped the issue might be laid to rest.40
Eisenhower himself might have accepted the
George Amendment, but again felt such an
amendment was not necessary. He also feared its
passage might make it appear that the Democrats
40
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had once again saved his administration. Yet, as
historian Daune Tananbaum noted, this was hardly
the reality; in fact Eisenhower ―. . . played an active
role in the deliberations within the administration
and the efforts to work out a compromise with
Senator George and the Democrats and the
Republican leaders.‖41 On February 26, 1954, both
amendments were up for a vote. Bricker‘s only
garnered forty-two votes to fifty in opposition.
George received sixty votes, but thirty-one opposed
him, which kept the amendment from meeting the
required support from the two-thirds of the Senate.42
Johnson had apparently executed the voting exactly
41
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to his desire and received the credit he sought from
the press. What the press missed was how
Republican dissent from the George Resolution
effectively showcased Eisenhower‘s influence, as
thirteen moderate ―Eisenhower Republicans‖ voted
against George, because, as Tananbaum noted, ―of
the administration‘s objections.‖43 Scholars have
looked to the Bricker debate to prove Johnson‘s
prowess as Majority Leader, and, for that matter, his
ability to calculate votes and hold Democratic
support exactly where he wanted it should give him
notable credit for diffusing Bricker. As the ―master
of the Senate,‖ Johnson deserves no less. Still,
Eisenhower worked his own influence behind the
scenes (and in public, wherever necessary), and
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played a critical role in working towards the goal,
which, on this occasion, he and Johnson shared.
The debate over the Bricker Amendment
was only a momentary interruption in the saga of
Senator Joseph R. McCarthy. As McCarthy‘s
committee began hearings with the U.S. Army in
early 1954, Johnson kept silent. He feared a
Democratic assault against McCarthy would unite
the Republicans and make the notorious Wisconsin
senator a partisan issue. As Johnson put it, ―. . . why
put on the brave act, beat one‘s chest, and net
twenty-five votes against Joe, and in turn get
smeared and unite the Republicans behind Joe.‖44
Although Democrats and Johnson approved
McCarthy‘s censure, it was Eisenhower‘s efforts to
subtly undermine McCarthy that had greater
44
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influence in slowly, but surely, securing
McCarthy‘s downfall.45 United Nations
Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge later wrote that in
a meeting on January 21, 1954, Eisenhower laid out
a clever strategy based on televising the upcoming
Army-McCarthy hearings. Figuring the hearings
would not go well for McCarthy, Eisenhower then
arranged for Vermont Senator Ralph Flanders to
call for McCarthy‘s censure. This move ultimately
triggered an investigative committee which
recommended censure to the entire Senate body.
Eisenhower‘s plan moved cautiously, but its result
indicated that Eisenhower was just as crafty as the
wily Johnson.46 Johnson, though, worked
effectively as well, wherever he thought he could
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help to undermine McCarthy. Especially when,
prior to his censure, McCarthy introduced a
resolution limiting presidential ability to negotiate
within the ―Big Four‖ powers (Great Britain,
France, the Soviet Union, and the United States).
Johnson countered McCarthy‘s attention-getting
ploy by quickly bringing it to a vote on the floor,
where it was struck down. Eisenhower privately
celebrated the result, saying ―McCarthyism‖ had
been reduced to ―McCarthywasm.‖47 Thus, while
Johnson and Eisenhower did not necessarily work
jointly, they again had a common goal in seeing
McCarthy‘s influence ended, and aided each other
by both working towards it.
Playing Politics: Cracks in the Partnership
During the second term, their dynamic
shifted significantly. The two shared fewer goals as
47
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Johnson was no longer satisfied helping the
President‘s agenda, but instead wanted to advance
one of his own - an agenda which benefitted him
the most. Johnson‘s change of heart, however,
allowed Eisenhower to prove his true leadership
ability in Congress, through issues like civil rights
in 1957. Based on proposals made by Attorney
General Herbert Brownell in 1956, proposals which
never made it to the Senate floor, the Civil Rights
Act of 1957 would be the most critical piece of
legislation debated by the Congress that year. This
came about, according to Brownell, thanks to
Illinois Senator Paul Douglas, who managed to
―extract‖ a promise from Johnson which assured
civil rights would be considered early in the 1957
session.48 Then Vice President Richard Nixon,
48
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Republican Leader William Knowland, and
Brownell arranged for Knowland to bring the act to
the Senate floor directly, where Nixon, as the
presiding officer, authorized the bill for
consideration by the full Senate, thus allowing the
act to avoid first being sent to the Senate Judiciary
Committee, where Chairman James Eastland, a
vehement supporter of segregation, would certainly
have killed it. By employing an obscure Senate rule,
these members of Eisenhower‘s team managed to
advance the measure. Kept uninformed of this
maneuver, Johnson and other southerners in the
Senate denounced the scheme as unfair.49 The
provisions of Brownell and Eisenhower‘s Act
established a Civil Rights Commission, created a
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Civil Rights Division at the Justice Department,
authorized the Attorney General to bring charges
against voting rights discrimination, and guaranteed
no jury trials for civil rights violators (as all-white
juries typically acquitted those charged with civil
rights violations). Johnson allowed debate to begin
on the bill, but remained neutral on it.50 Johnson
wanted a mild civil rights act that would pacify his
caucus of Democrats which was becoming
increasingly fractured between liberals and
conservatives.51 Johnson argued that the bill would
not be passed if the clause giving the Attorney
General authority in regards to voting rights
remained in the legislation. This codicil infuriated
50
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the President, who already saw the bill as a
compromise solution. Nevertheless, Eisenhower
agreed to withdraw his support for that clause.52 As
Brownell insisted, Eisenhower had to be practical.53
However, historian David Nichols questioned
whether Eisenhower knew some of these provisions
would fail and used them as bargaining tools against
Johnson and the southern Democrats.54
Johnson, however, weakened the Civil
Rights Act further by proposing an amendment
which would have guaranteed jury trials to those
accused of committing civil rights violations.
Johnson took this action to ease the fears of
southerners about the Act. Angered, Eisenhower
52
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considered scrapping the entire Act.55 Instead,
Eisenhower and newly sworn-in Attorney General
William Rogers used their influence on Capitol Hill
to reach a compromise with Johnson and the
Democrats on the Act‘s final language, which
dictated that the specifics of a case would determine
whether defendants would have a jury trial.56 The
compromise provided that as long as a defendant
faced no more than a three-hundred dollar fine and
a jail sentence of forty-five days (reduced from
ninety), no jury would be gathered.57 Despite a
twenty-four hour filibuster by Senator Strom
Thurmond, the first Civil Rights Act was passed by
Congress and signed by the President in late
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August. Johnson took credit for the bill, while all of
the efforts of Eisenhower and his subordinates were
less obvious by comparison.58 Johnson had walked
a tight-rope between a crusader for civil rights who
would soon be seeking the presidency and a
pragmatic senator trying not to lose the support of
his southern delegation. Regardless of who received
credit for the bill, clearly Johnson was not the ally
he used to be for Eisenhower.
The remainder of 1957 only worsened their
relationship. Back in May, Johnson and the Senate
had cut funding for the United States Information
Agency (USIA), a critical aspect of the President‘s
propaganda efforts. Eisenhower wrote Johnson, ―I
am very disappointed that in this instance you found
it desirable to reduce rather than to increase the
58
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pressure of our effort [with the USIA] . . . it is still
difficult for me to understand why this vital weapon
in our arsenal would be blunted at this critical
juncture in world affairs.‖59 Johnson also opposed
Eisenhower‘s decision to send the 101st Airborne
Division to Little Rock High School for the
enforcement of school desegregation. Johnson
remarked, ―There should be no troops from either
side patrolling our school campuses.‖60 Later, as the
1957 session drew to a close, Congress appropriated
only $2.7 billion of the $3.8 billion in funding
Eisenhower had requested for mutual security
programs. Looking back, Eisenhower sourly
concluded, ―The 1957 session marked the low point
in effective cooperation between the administration
59
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and the Congress.‖61 The situation looked no better
in 1958.
Space Race Initiatives
As much as the Senate suited him, Johnson‘s
life‘s desire was to be president, and Eisenhower‘s
closed-door methods sometimes allowed an
uncooperative Johnson to act the part. A notable
example followed the Soviet Union‘s October 1,
1957 launch of Sputnik, the first satellite to orbit the
earth. As described by Johnson‘s aide George
Reedy, Sputnik stunned the American public and
fueled fears that the United States was now falling
behind in the technological battle of the Cold War.
Eisenhower, according to Reedy, dismissed Sputnik
as an expensive ―toy.‖62 Eisenhower did tell the
press, ―As far as the satellite is concerned, that does
61
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not raise my apprehensions [about the Soviet
Union], not one iota. I can see nothing at this
moment, at this stage of development, that is
significant . . . as far as security is concerned.‖63
However, Eisenhower‘s words were surely spoken
with a desire to calm the fears of the public, and not
out of ignorance, as Reedy implied. Nevertheless,
using his seat of the Senate Armed Services
Subcommittee on Preparedness as his platform,
Johnson brought in scientists to testify about the
importance of understanding and traveling in outer
space. Johnson then introduced the National
Aeronautic and Space Act before the Senate during
the 1958 session. This piece of legislation
established the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA), a national civilian space
63
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agency. To cap off his efforts, Johnson delivered a
nationally televised speech about the need for
exploration in space, in a performance which some
called his first ―State of the Union‖ address.
Overall, Reedy wrote, ―The picture was that of a
president ignoring what many people regarded as
the greatest crisis in centuries while the Senate
Democratic leader was working night and day to
mobilize the nation to meet the challenge.‖ This
situation further enhanced the argument that the real
power in Washington lay with Lyndon Johnson, as
some Americans began to ask if this was the man
who was really running the country.64 However,
Reedy conveniently excluded from his narrative an
64
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executive message from Eisenhower to Congress a
full two months before the Space Act passed. It was
this message which formally proposed the creation
of NASA.65 In fact, any hesitation from the White
House towards the Space Act was not derived from
opposition to NASA itself, but rather due to
objections concerning the creation of a sevenmember policy board for the federal space agency.
Eisenhower and his advisors felt the board was in
conflict ―with the concept of a single head [of
NASA] directly responsible to the President,‖ and
was likely to divide responsibilities, and make it
―difficult to hold anyone accountable for results.‖66
Clearly Eisenhower was not unconcerned with
65
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satellites and space exploration and even had his
own recommendations on the matter.67 To resolve
the issue, Eisenhower arranged a private meeting
with Johnson and convinced the Majority Leader to
replace the policy board with an advisory group,
which gave greater authority over NASA to the
President.68 With these facts in mind, and though
Johnson was the crucial force in establishing the
space agency, Reedy‘s assessment of Eisenhower as
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an unconcerned and out-of-touch president, an
impression some historians embraced, is proven
inaccurate.
A Most Shameful Day and the End of Cooperation
Eisenhower, however, was not destined to
always emerge victorious when he and Johnson
were not aligned. By 1959, Johnson‘s and
Eisenhower‘s interactions had become much more
limited. On June 25 Eisenhower had sent Johnson a
strongly worded letter urging him, in the name of
protecting the nation‘s classified information, to
withhold a resolution permitting Congress to
investigate national security agencies up to their
highest levels of authority. What is most striking
about the letter, though, is that Eisenhower no
longer addresses it ―Dear Lyndon‖ (as was
customary with earlier correspondence), but a more
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formal ―Dear Senator Johnson,‖ suggesting that
their partnership was now more distant.69 George
Reedy, for one, noticed Eisenhower was applying
the veto power much more frequently. 70 Conditions
reached a boiling point when Eisenhower
nominated former Atomic Energy Commission
member Lewis Strauss to be Secretary of
Commerce. Strauss, though, had already clashed
with Congressional Democrats while serving on the
commission.71 Although Johnson was publicly
undecided about Strauss until the day of the
69
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confirmation vote in June, he had worked covertly
to gain the support of Republicans William Langer
and Margaret Chase Smith to oppose Strauss.72
Always the master of surprises, Johnson brought the
confirmation to a vote rather unexpectedly on June
18th, when three Republican Senators were out of
town and one could not return in time (Eisenhower
dispatched two Air Force planes to pick-up the
other two).73 Johnson‘s scheme had made all the
difference as Strauss was voted down by a 49-46
margin. No better example illustrates Johnson‘s
greatest advantage over Eisenhower: the power he
72
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held over the Senate. Regardless of how the
President tried to influence or sway him, Johnson
had his own methods of persuading or controlling
his fellow senators. In the end, it was fairly often
the case that Johnson made the final call on issues
like the Strauss nomination. Eisenhower, on the
other hand, was simply enraged by the final vote,
declaring ―this is the most shameful day in Senate
history [since the attempt to impeach Andrew
Johnson in the 1868].‖74 Privately, he consoled
Strauss by writing him, ―I believe that all those
members of the Senate who voted against your
confirmation will eventually come to reflect with
deep regret upon the day they decided to refuse
confirmation to one whose reputation for courage,
integrity, and good judgment makes him one of our
74
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distinguished Americans.‖75 Johnson was deeply
offended by Eisenhower‘s criticism, and barely
spoke with the President until he received a call
from Eisenhower ―apologizing for any
misunderstanding.‖76 Still, the damage was done
and the Strauss nomination appeared to join the
Bohlen nomination in 1953 as bookends for the
Eisenhower-Johnson dynamic, as essentially one
opened and the other closed the relationship. As
Johnson planned to seek his party‘s nomination in
1960, any remaining camaraderie between the two
faded. Johnson, as the next presidential election
neared, distanced himself from Eisenhower, and the
President was growing exhausted with Johnson‘s
political games.
75
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In March of 1960 the two managed to
cooperate for one last significant compromise, a
second Civil Rights Act. Eisenhower‘s version of
the act would have been an indirect endorsement of
the 1954 Supreme Court decision Brown v. Board
of Education of Topeka.77 Johnson, though,
garnered enough support to pull education grants
from the act. However, Eisenhower refused to
concede a clause which allowed federal authorities
to inspect voter registration lists and assess
penalties if cases of clear discrimination arose.
After eighteen southern senators filibustered for
one-hundred and twenty-five hours, the longest in
Senate history, Johnson broke the filibuster and the
Senate passed the Civil Rights Act. Once more,
Johnson received much of the publicity and credit
77
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while Eisenhower was the silent force behind the
legislation.78 Following the final vote, Republican
Congressional Leaders complained to Eisenhower
during one of their many meetings with the
President that they were upset by Johnson‘s
coverage in the media. Exasperated as well,
Eisenhower admitted, ―I don‘t know what to do but I get annoyed about [the credit going to
Johnson] . . . Except for this political game, I
wouldn‘t care who gets credit for something that‘s
good to have.‖79 Few statements better summarize
this position, which Eisenhower held consistently
throughout his tenure. Months later the approach of
the 1960 election brought these ill feelings between
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the two to a fever-pitch. At one of his stag dinners
in late July, Eisenhower was asked by members of
the press to name several Democrats whom he
respected and who might be nominated to succeed
him as president. Eisenhower listed Senators John
Stennis of Mississippi, Spessard Holland of Florida,
and Frank Lausche of Ohio. Reporters were quick
to note the absence of Johnson from the President‘s
―recommendations,‖ though based their increased
hostilities during Eisenhower‘s second term, this
should not have been surprising. The President even
refused the suggestion of his aide Bryce Harlow to
mention Johnson‘s name after the fact. Ann
Whitman noted, ―The President brushed the
[suggestion] off, saying that Johnson had made
some comments much worse about him . . .‖ The
result was an awkward meeting between
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Eisenhower, Johnson, Rayburn, and Harlow on
August 3rd. Meant to be another simple private chat
to discuss Congressional matters, the gathering was
marked by Johnson giving the President the silent
treatment. In the aftermath of these events, Robert
Anderson went to meet with Johnson while
Eisenhower‘s own Congressional liaison fractured
as Harlow accused Wilton Persons and Press
Secretary James Hagerty of ―poisoning the
President‘s mind‖ against Johnson and firmly
declared that Johnson would make the best
president out of any Democrat.‖80
Ultimately, the point was moot as Johnson
had been nominated by the Democrats for the Vice
Presidency several weeks earlier, but was
significant in that these events acknowledged that
80
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the relationship between the President and the
Senate Majority Leader had ended. Congress was
soon in recess for the election season, which saw
Eisenhower make a multi-state campaign tour on
behalf of Nixon‘s Presidential campaign. Once
more, Eisenhower and Johnson were on completely
opposed sides, this time in one of the most
contentious presidential elections of the twentieth
century. No other reason so effectively
demonstrated why their partnership could not
endure, for they ultimately had party allegiances
that, at their core, made them political adversaries.
The Common Experience of the Presidency
Following Senator John Kennedy‘s triumph
over Nixon in the election, Eisenhower sent
telegrams to the candidates on both parties‘ national
tickets. The shortest, just a one sentence message of
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congratulations, was sent to Vice President-elect
Johnson.81 Whatever remained of their relationship
seemingly mattered little, as both Johnson and
Eisenhower would soon face new positions,
especially as the latter would shortly be leaving
public service for retirement.
Neither Eisenhower nor Johnson received all
of what they wanted out of their relationship.
Eisenhower did not get all of his administration‘s
agenda passed, and Johnson was obviously not
elected president in 1960. Yet, a firm portion of the
Eisenhower Administration‘s agenda was enacted
and Johnson would become president in time.
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Ultimately, Johnson was far easier for Eisenhower
to work with then many Democrats and even certain
Republicans such as Bricker, McCarthy, and
Knowland. Additionally, Eisenhower‘s sometimes
covert leadership allowed Johnson to get the press
and praise he craved. Together, they managed to
share power in a political chess game for
Eisenhower‘s entire tenure (six years of which
found the Senate controlled by Johnson and the
Democrats) with only minimal public spats. Their
relationship, interestingly, would greatly improve in
the 1960s as Eisenhower became a valuable
supporter of President Johnson as armed conflict in
the country of Vietnam intensified with the
dramatic escalation of U.S. forces. Their partnership
during the 1950s, even at its best moments, had
never been close. It was, some argued, the common
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experience of the being President which aided their
reconciliation.
History still judges their respective legacies.
Their philosophies were different and their methods
were nearly polar opposites, but together they
helped the government function in meaningful ways
throughout the 1950s. This story is also a small part
of a larger narrative about Eisenhower and his
leadership. For someone who entered the
presidency with no legislative experience,
Eisenhower was quick to grasp the challenges and
opportunities it presented him as president,
including the savvy Democratic leader whom
Eisenhower had to flatter, appease, pressure, and
take-to-task in order to achieve the amount of
success with Congress he wanted. The fact that
Eisenhower learned to deal with Johnson, regardless
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of whether the Majority Leader was being helpful,
stubborn, or manipulative, said something about the
President‘s ability to grasp the inner-workings of
partisan politics. Ultimately, Johnson was a fairly
open book to Eisenhower; he knew what the Texan
wanted and how devious he was in his efforts at
political domination and self-promotion. One must
imagine the disadvantage lay with Senator Johnson,
who appeared unable to fully comprehend the
motives of the private, calculated, and cautious
Eisenhower, which was a tribute to the President‘s
methodology for governing: a popular confidence
with a quiet but powerful presence of authority.
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The Quiet War: Nazi Agents in America
By Robert Kellert
In the summer of 1942, the East Coast bore
witness to an aberration when a German submarine
appeared in the waters off Long Island, seemingly
countless miles from the bitter fighting and utter
carnage engulfing Europe.1 Only four days later,
another submarine unexpectedly surfaced, this time
near Ponte Vedra Beach off the coast of Florida.2
The United States, historically protected from its
enemies abroad by the vast stretches of the mighty
Atlantic, now found itself exposed to the
Unterseeboote that had once provoked the

1

Albert L. Cox, "The Saboteur Story," Records of
the Columbia Historical Society, Washington, D.C. 57/59, 16.
2
Leon O. Prior, "Nazi Invasion of Florida!," The
Florida Historical Quarterly 49 no. 2 (Oct., 1970): 129.
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superpower into world war.3 The submarines
harbored agents of the notorious German spy
organization known as the Abwehr; and while these
agents‘ ultimate capture epitomized the failure of
many German intelligence operations in the United
States, their activity reaffirmed American fears of
Nazi spies and American subversives within.
Beyond its immediate impact, Operation
PASTORIUS inadvertently led the United States
government to reflect on the legal treatment of its
enemies—an issue that, more than sixty years later,
remains to be resolved.
The Abwehr, whose name is derived from
the German word for ―defense,‖ was hardly a
defensive organization. A military intelligence
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agency spearheaded by the ―almost legendary‖
Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, the Abwehr flourished
under the leadership of Canaris, who made it
immediately clear—as early as 1935—that the
United States would be ―‗one of the [Abwehr‘s] key
targets.‘‖4
The United States, adhering to its
isolationist doctrine and in the midst of an economic
depression, still seemed to threaten Germany‘s
interests in the near future. Nazi Germany appeared
both aware of, and concerned with, America‘s
ability to exert its diplomatic and military influence
on the world stage six years before its entrance into
World War II. Canaris, for one, recognized the
―‗capacity of its [America‘s] industrial power‘‖ to
4
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―‗assure victory.‘‖5 Thus, responding to the earliest
portents of global conflict, Germany was preparing
its spy war—its quiet war—against the United
States.
Ironically, Admiral Canaris personally
opposed Adolf Hitler‘s regime.6 Brutal mass
executions following the Nazis‘ Blitzkrieg against
Poland in 1938 had prompted Canaris to question
Hitler‘s intentions in occupying Poland. He
demanded an explanation for the ―outrages‖
committed there by the Nazis, fearing that the world
would ―‗eventually blame the Wehrmacht‘‖ for
merely carrying out ―‗these unheard-of atrocities‘‖

5
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of Hitler‘s personal ambitions.7 The prevalent
German ―monstrosity‖ in Poland, coupled with
Hitler‘s willingness to go to war against England—
whose potential future support from the United
States ―frightened‖ Canaris—cemented tensions
between the admiral and his Führer.8 Nevertheless,
Canaris had to perform his duty—if not for the
Führer, then for Germany.
Canaris and the Abwehr were far from alone
in Germany‘s intelligence services, however. The
Sicherheitdeinst (―security service‖) and
Reichsicherheitshauptamt (―main security agency of
the [German] empire,‖ also known as the R.S.H.A.)
supplemented one another while the Luftwaffe even
maintained its own research office, specializing in

7
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―signal intelligence.‖9 Despite this extensive
intelligence bureaucracy, whose very intricacy
likely hampered the efficiency of gathering and
transmitting reliable intelligence, the Abwehr took
the lead in initiating espionage in the United
States.10 The United States also had secret designs,
however, and stood as ready to infiltrate Germany
with its own spies as it was to intercept Nazi
saboteurs in American territory.
Admiral Canaris had an equally shrewd
American counterpart in William Donovan, head of
the Office of Strategic Services (O.S.S.). The
precursor to the C.I.A., the O.S.S. emerged from a
primitive intelligence agency, the Office of the
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Coordinator of Information (C.O.I.), which
Donovan had also directed.11 Following America‘s
entry into World War II, the propaganda wing of the
C.O.I. separated from the organization and the
C.O.I. thereafter became the Office of War
Information; it was soon renamed the Office of
Strategic Services and placed under the watchful
eye of William Donovan.12
William Donovan hardly qualified as a
mainstream intelligence director. A wealthy
corporate lawyer of Republican persuasion,
Donovan nonetheless had President Franklin
Roosevelt‘s support in creating an ―international
secret service‖ for the United States ―equal to the
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Nazi challenge.‖13 Even Roosevelt, who ―saved
Donovan‘s bureaucratic life‖ on more than one
occasion, purportedly warned, ―‗We must find a
way to harness this guy, because if we don‘t he will
be doing a lot of things other than what we want
him to do.‘‖14 The Joint Chiefs concurred with
Roosevelt, reluctant to bring Donovan‘s
―propaganda machinery‖ into the military realm;
they did, however, agree to absorb the O.S.S.
without its propaganda wing.15
The Joint Chiefs relegated Donovan‘s new
organization to two primary functions: to ―‗collect
and analyze such strategic information as may be
required by the Joint Chiefs of Staff‘‖ and to ―‗plan
13
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into CIA," Grand Street 2 no. 2 (Winter, 1983): 181.
15
Joseph E. Persico, Roosevelt's Secret War: FDR
and World War II Espionage, (New York: Random House,
2001), 187.
14

230

and operate such special services as may be
directed.‘‖16 On June 13, 1942, President Roosevelt
issued an executive order authorizing the creation of
the O.S.S. Though empowered by this move, the
savvy Donovan knew not to overstep his bounds:
―‗[T]hese admirals and generals might be willing to
sit down with citizen Donovan, but not with
General Donovan.‘‖17 Colleague Allen Dulles
sensed an ―indefatigable energy‖ and ―great
resourcefulness‖ in the former World War I war
hero, foreshadowing the remarkable creativity with
which the O.S.S. would operate under Donovan‘s
leadership.18
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O.S.S. planning chief James Grafton Rogers
reflected on the new agency with amusement,
intrigue, and in a sense, fascination:
The Office is the most interesting collection
of people and their doings I have ever served
in or known. Yale, the State Department, the
old ―Sun,‖ the Cactus Club, the university at
Boulder—all were less colorful. It may
expire any minute. I feel every day is the
last. The Joint Staff is trying to understand it
and knows the ability collected and needed
for some organization of organized and
secret subversion. It recognizes R. and A. is
a wonderful information service. But it may
lose patience.19
Rogers‘s pithy description encapsulates the
character of the O.S.S. Here was a body of
incomparably diverse individuals working—
independently and in tandem—toward the same
goal: a war of subversion. William Donovan had
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every right to be cautious as the Joint Chiefs
struggled to grasp the nature of this mysterious new
intelligence agency, its capacity and its limitations.
Donovan seemed to understand the fragility of the
O.S.S. as well as anyone could have: until the
agency could prove its worth, it had to tread
cautiously.
Of O.S.S. ―planning,‖ James Rogers noted:
The work is like watching a kaleidoscope.
The pattern is changed every morning. Bill
Donovan dreams up something overnight
perhaps. A mission to Brazil—need for an
overall psychological warfare plan, a
venture in North Africa, a revision of the
whole O.S.S. show. I never wake up to see
what I went to bed with.20
The O.S.S. operated extemporaneously; yet, this
appeared to be one of its greatest assets. For
William Donovan, rigidity inhibited innovation; and
so the men of the O.S.S were encouraged to work as
20
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pioneers, not as order-takers. As O.S.S. Colonel
David Bruce remarked, ―‗Woe to the officer who
turned down a project because, on its face, it
seemed ridiculous, or at least unusual.‘‖21
William Donovan infused his independence
of mind into the O.S.S. Appreciated and respected
within the O.S.S., Donovan sometimes met bitter
resistance outside the organization. One of his most
contentious relationships was with J. Edgar Hoover,
of whom Donovan became a nominal boss
following his appointment as Assistant Attorney
General in 1924.22 By 1942, tensions between the
two men had mounted, not dissipated. Concerned
over whether Spain would remain neutral as the
Allies prepared their invasion of North Africa, the
O.S.S. authorized a mission to photograph ―cipher
21
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pads to [of?] the Spanish diplomatic code.‖23 As
O.S.S. agents were opening the safe, FBI agents
stormed the location, arrested the O.S.S. men and
confiscated their stolen material, prompting
Donovan to state, ―‗The Abwehr gets better
treatment from the FBI than we do.‘‖24 The silent
war between the Abwehr and the O.S.S. had begun;
but in the meantime, the FBI was fighting its own
war—not on the European mainland, but on the
American home front.
With a significant population of GermanAmericans, the United States faced dissent from
within. Unlike prior waves of immigrants, German
immigrants in the twentieth century came to
America driven more by ―material incentives‖ than
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―democratic conviction.‖25 Still harboring proGerman sentiments, millions of German-Americans
resided in the land of one of Nazi Germany‘s most
formidable foes.26 Organizations like the GermanAmerican Bund, under the leadership of the
National Socialists Bund‘s Fritz Gissibl and Sepp
Schuster, sparked suspicion and concern over
domestic subversion. Gissibl also helped found the
ominously-named organization, ―Friends of New
Germany.‖27
Even more ominous was the prospect of
radicals like Gissibl and Schuster returning to Nazi
Germany. Both men, in fact, returned and founded

25

Christof Mauch. The Shadow War Against Hitler:
The Covert Operations of America's Wartime Secret
Intelligence Service, trans. Jeremiah Riemer (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2003), 45.
26
Ibid.
27
Arthur L. Smith, Jr., "The Kameradschaft USA,"
The Journal of Modern History 34 no. 4 (Dec., 1962): 398399.

236

the Kameradschaft U.S.A.28 German intelligence
organizations like the Abwehr thus had an
accessible pool of disloyal Americans to facilitate,
and participate in, their espionage operations in the
United States.
The arrest of Carl Herman Schroetter on
September 2, 1941, in Miami reinforced fears over a
German ―fifth column‖ in America. Schroetter, born
in Switzerland and educated in Germany,
immigrated to the United States in 1913. He settled
into an unsuspicious identity and operated the
charter boat, Echo of the Past.29 Schroetter
allegedly garnered and dispatched information
―concerning the national defense‖ to Kurt Frederick
Ludwig, a German agent operating out of New
28
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York City.30 Schroetter‘s arrest proved even more
symbolic than efficacious in the U.S.-Germany
intelligence war: ―Schroetter‘s arrest emphasizes
the alertness with which the FBI is maintaining its
vigil against possible spies.‖31
This deliberate statement, unlike others in
the article, suggests that Americans became
concerned about internal dangers and needed
assurance that authorities like the FBI were doing
all in their power to protect the American
homeland. Federal Judge Henry W. Goddard
sentenced Carl Schroetter to ten years in prison, half
of Ludwig‘s sentence.32
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Curiously, Goddard also sentenced Lucy
Boehmler, a high school student, to five years in
―women‘s reformatory‖ at the Alderson Federal
Prison in West Virginia for exclaiming that she
―found espionage lots of fun.‖33 Boehmler had, in
fact, accompanied Kurt Ludwig on his missions and
assisted him in establishing contact with American
military personnel, typically in army camps and
nearby taverns.34 Upon further examination, it
seems that Boehmler—hardly an innocent,
―misguided‖ bystander—had actually facilitated
Nazi intelligence operations in the U.S. that led to
the sinking of ―allied ships sailing from New
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York.‖35 According to a government witness, the
spy ring with which Boehmler associated herself
relayed vital information that reached as high in the
German hierarchy as SS chief and Gestapo
overseer, Heinrich Himmler.36
In light of these unfortunate details,
especially, Judge Goddard‘s punishment seems not
only appropriate, but also lenient, for the damage
Boehmler helped inflict—without remorse—all in
the spirit of ―fun.‖ Boehmler‘s actions underscore
the tense wartime environment in 1940s America.
Citizens who facilitated German espionage were
feared and perhaps looked upon with even more
contempt than German spies. For beyond being
enemies of the state, American subversives had
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betrayed their home, the beacon of opposition to
Fascism and Communism alike, and defected to the
nefarious interests of the fascist Nazi regime.
Boehmler‘s anti-American activities establish the
context so critical to evaluating both the real and
perceived Nazi threats to the nation. For many
American citizens, the threat of Nazi espionage was
real; on several occasions, they were correct. Three
unanticipated events in the coming two years were
about to confirm their anxiety.
German espionage had yielded only modest
gains since the arrest and detainment of thirty-three
Nazi agents following an FBI raid in July 1941.37
The raid, declared “the nation‘s biggest spy suspect
roundup,” hindered, but did not incapacitate, Nazi
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intelligence-gathering in the United States.38
Arraigned on charges of “acting as agents for a
foreign government without so registering‖ and
―conspiracy to transmit vital information to a
foreign government,‖ twenty-three of the thirtythree suspects pleaded not guilty.39 On January 2,
1941, the suspects received an aggregate two
hundred sixty-eight years of imprisonment, with the
―heaviest‖ sentences of eighteen years given to
Herman Lang, Edmund Carl Heine, and Frederick
Joubert Duquesne—all native citizens—for relaying
―details of the Norden bombsight to Germany.‖40
Ironically, Germany‘s most threatening
intelligence presence in America may have been its
38
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most visible. German diplomatic officials alone
offered German intelligence services unique
vehicles for acquiring and delivering information—
a less suspicious method of gathering intelligence
prevalent throughout history since the time of the
Byzantine Empire.41 In many cases, clandestine
intelligence agents merely confirmed information
already acquired from German diplomats.42
Overseeing clandestine operations, the
Abwehr had, in fact, been ―up to its neck in
sabotage operations in the United States‖ for quite
some time.43 Despite setbacks such as the FBI raid
in the summer of 1944, the Abwehr persisted with
its operations in the ―lion‘s den.‖ Under pressure
from Hitler to ―disrupt American armaments
41
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production,‖ Canaris authorized Operation
PASTORIUS, named after one of Germany‘s first
settlers in America, Franz Pastorius.44 In what
Colonel Lahousen, the head of Abwehr‘s successor
agency, Abwehr II, called ―‗the biggest blunder that
ever occurred in Abwehr II,‘‖ eight German agents
set out on a futile mission aimed at aluminum
production sites—critical to the supply of American
aircraft—in Philadelphia, Massena, New York, East
St. Louis, Illinois and Alcoa, Tennessee.45
Intriguingly, their more general mission was
to incite American furor through acts of sabotage.
Americans would consequently direct their outrage
and suspicions toward German-Americans living in
the United States, thus prompting them to form a
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―fifth column‖ movement within America.46 All
eight agents had lived in the United States at one
time; two were American citizens, reaffirming
public concerns over subversive pro-German
sympathizers residing in America.47
Georg Dasch, Ernest Burger, Herbert Haupt,
Edward Kerling, Richard Quirin, Hermann
Neubauer, and Werner Thiel—all had left for
Germany on their own volition, ―inspired by the
glowing promise of the Third Reich.‖48 Nazi
intelligence missions in the United States seemed to
revolve around a few common objectives covering a
gamut of vital American targets:



Track American advances in science and
technology.
Assess American political trends and
their impact on foreign policy.
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Obtain information on tensions between
Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill (for
exploitation).
Keep abreast of potential invasion plans.
Accurately estimate America‘s
production figures and judge its fighting
and logistics potentials accordingly.
Conduct sabotage, primarily for
―creating bottlenecks in the American
economy.‖49

Operation PASTORIUS agents focused more on
active sabotage than passive espionage, destruction
more than observation. This correlated with a shift
in German intelligence efforts after America‘s
declaration of war; for Germany‘s most noteworthy
and therefore likely more successful intelligence
operations were primarily those of sabotage, not
espionage.50 Aware of America‘s potential strength,
Hitler sought to weaken America‘s production
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capacity; and so the agents prepared to oblige their
Führer—for the time being.51
The eight operatives were divided into two
U-boats—one team led by Georg Dasch, the other
by Edward Kerling.52 With $174,588 in American
bills, the teams mobilized for their high-risk mission
approved by Admiral Canaris, who immediately
thereafter offered a foreboding caveat: ―This will
cost these poor men their lives.‖53 Canaris, an
apparent pragmatist often left at the whim of his
impractical Führer, had few illusions regarding the
mission‘s success; he could only oblige.
Departing Continental Europe, eight agents
of the fatherland set out on their task to breed chaos
on the American mainland and sabotage ―aluminum
51
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and power plants, railroad right of ways and Ohio
River locks.‖54 The agents had studied drawings of
New York City‘s water supply system and even the
hydroelectric plant at Niagara Falls.55 In their ―spare
time,‖ they were to incite fear among the American
population with explosives disguised as innocuous
objects like ―fountain pens, and pencils, others
briquettes of coal.‖56
On June 13, under cover of darkness, U-202
(the Innsbruck), carrying Georg Dasch and his
team, came to a stop within 500 miles of the Long
Island shore.57 The team was then paddled to the
shore by some of the Innsbruck‘s crew, and set foot
on a beach not far from Amagansett. As they buried
gear they no longer needed, Dasch‘s team heard a
54
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discomfiting shout of ―Who are you?‖ from John
Cullen, a rookie Coast Guardsman.58 The foolhardy
Dasch gave Cullen $260, and simply replied,
―Forget about this.‖59 Cullen relayed his encounter
to the Coast Guard, who reported the incident to the
FBI.60 (―Greedy and unscrupulous,‖ Dasch may
have plotted to keep the money used to finance the
operation after betraying his fellow agents to the
FBI.)61
Upon reaching New York, about 105 miles
away, Dasch and his three fellow operatives
checked into the Martinique and Governor Clinton
Hotels—Heinck and Quirin into the Martinique,
Dasch and Berger into the Governor Clinton. Dasch
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and his partners made the most of their excursion to
America, ―investing‖ their money in luxury and
pleasure, ―expensive clothes and fancy
restaurants.‖62 Among these indulgences was a
supposed 36-hour pinochle game.63
According to Albert Cox, jailer and
custodian of the agents following their
apprehension, Dasch and Ernst Burger had already
agreed to betray their mission to the FBI after their
shore landing.64 Joseph Persico, in Roosevelt’s
Secret War, claims the agreement was made later, in
a ―cautious conversation‖ at the Governor Clinton,
during which Dasch convinced Burger of their
mission‘s futility. Dasch, according to Persico,
allegedly suggested that, if the men turned
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themselves in, they would not only be treated with
leniency, but even esteem.65 Burger, who had once
endured torture and his pregnant wife‘s miscarriage
during a 17-month internment in a concentration
camp at the hands of the Gestapo, probably had few
qualms about turning himself in.66
As Dasch immersed himself in the high life,
he was merely buying time for their eventual
betrayal of the saboteurs‘ mission. He told Burger
to keep the ―‗two Dutchmen‘‖—what Dasch and
Burger called their ―less Americanized German
colleagues‖—at bay as he established contact with
the FBI.67 After attempting to call J. Edgar Hoover,
Dasch eventually made contact with an FBI agent
and soon exposed his entire operation to the FBI in
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full detail at FBI headquarters in Washington,
D.C.68 His three partners waited in New York—
only Burger knew their future. They were
subsequently apprehended with ease.69
Meanwhile, four days after Dasch and his
partners had landed on the Long Island shore, the
second PASTORIUS team—Edward Kerling,
Herbert Haupt, Hermann Neubauer and Werner
Thiel—made landfall on Ponte Vedra Beach. Albert
Cox suggests that, had Dasch not so luxuriated in
New York, the FBI could have apprehended the
Florida spy team sooner.70 Dasch did divulge the
Florida team‘s operation to the FBI, but the delay
proved inconvenient.71
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Dasch‘s and Burger‘s partners showed no
more devotion to their mission. Herbert Haupt
traveled to Chicago, where he was to acquire an
automobile and an employment position at the
Simpson Optical Company, where he had once
worked. (Haupt even found time to visit his parents,
who lived in the city; his parents, uncle and aunt
were later convicted of treason for providing him
aid and comfort.72) There, he would evaluate the
plant‘s vulnerabilities and relay his findings to his
partners, who would sabotage the plant accordingly.
Observing Haupt since he entered Chicago, federal
agents apprehended him on June 27, 1942, before
sabotage plans could be executed. Following his
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arraignment on July 21, Haupt ―volunteered
considerable information‖ to two FBI agents.73
By June 27, seven of the eight agents had
been apprehended, the last soon to be arrested.74
Nearly all the agents‘ American bills were
recovered as well. Franklin D. Roosevelt needed
little time to assess the spies‘ punishment, writing in
a memo to Attorney General Francis Biddle, ―‗The
two Americans are guilty of treason.‘‖75 Of the
other six, Roosevelt incorporated a historical
analogy favorable to his view: ―‗They were
apprehended in civilian clothes. This is an absolute
parallel of the Case of Major [John] Andre in the
Revolution and of Nathan Hale. Both of these men
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were hanged.‘‖76 Roosevelt concluded with an
unambiguous decision: ―‗The death penalty is called
for by usage and by the extreme gravity of the war
aim and the very existence of our American
government.‘‖77
Roosevelt personally desired strict legal
measures against the enemy spies and, through
forcefulness, was determined to get his way: ―‗I
want one thing clearly understood, Francis: I won‘t
give them up…I won‘t hand them over to any
United States Marshall armed with a writ of habeas
corpus. Understand!‘‖78 Biddle, who found himself
―trapped between the President‘s questionable
pressure and his own reverence for the law,‖ abided
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and the agents were ultimately tried by military
tribunal.79
Besides its wartime significance, the
saboteurs‘ trial set several important precedents. For
the first time in the history of the Supreme Court, its
justices were called from their vacations to convene
―midway through the trial.‖ Not only did this
assembly alone make history; the trial itself did, as
well. This was one of the few times that a special
military commission was ever called upon in the
nation‘s history. Furthermore, while all Supreme
Court Justices returned from their vacations, one of
the nine, Frank Murphy, did not partake in ―that
strange two-day mid-July sitting.‖80 Albert Cox, the
agents‘ custodian and thus, acting defendant during
this brief span, later recalled:
79
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Justice Frank Murphy, was then a
Lieutenant-Colonel in the Army, stationed at
Fort Benning. During the proceedings he
remained in uniform, within earshot but out
of sight of counsels and spectators, sitting
behind the curtain which shields the goings
and comings of the robed Justices between
their bench and the robing room. This, too,
must have been unprecedented in the
Supreme Court‘s annals.81
The trial concluded on August 3, 1942, and the
PASTORIUS agents were convicted.82
The agents‘ convictions brought more
scrutiny of the legal status of spies than was present
before the trial began, for it opened a debate that
resounds today as the United States weighs similar
issues with a different enemy:
Some laymen have expressed the opinion
that the saboteurs should not have been
given any sort of trial, that they should have
been summarily shot just as American
81
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agents in Germany would have been. But the
greatest tests of the principles for which we
are fighting comes when we must apply
them to those who would destroy them.
Justice must be done—but not by illegal, or
even questionable means.83
William P. Armstrong, in his Presidential Address
to the American Bar Association, expressed similar
sentiments, with accolades for the manner in which
justice was carried out without partiality,
obstruction, or exploitation:
The recent trial and proceedings in
connection with the trial of the Nazi
saboteurs reflected great credit upon the
nation. It was a practical demonstration that
we actually believe in the things for which
we are fighting. The accused were accorded
the benefit of counsel who were not only
sworn to defend them, but who, as I can
testify from personal observation, performed
that duty in a way that measured up to the
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finest traditions of the American Bar and
reflected great credit upon our profession.84
Evocative of John Adams‘s defense of a
Redcoat charged for his participation in the Boston
Massacre (though under different circumstances),
Armstrong‘s argument advocates America‘s
adherence to an ideal legal standard—one whose
application, particularly in wartime, might be called
into question; it was in 1942, and remains
controversial today. Arguing that the nation should
bestow certain rights shared by its own citizens to
its enemies, Armstrong raises concerns equally
relevant in the modern world. Armstrong‘s
interpretation of the legal proceedings corresponds
with that of Franklin Roosevelt Administration‘s
public opinion, but Roosevelt‘s personal will lurked
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in the background. Roosevelt, in fact, ordered the
military trial proceedings to be kept secret.85
Probing further into the evaluation of the
military commission itself, one comes upon another
familiar argument—in this particular case, the
implications of the Supreme Court‘s decision to
uphold the agents‘ plea for a writ of habeas corpus
and a public trial by ―civil authorities.‖86
When read as a whole, the preliminary
decision indicates that the court is not going
to hold that alien enemies have no rights, but
that modern military developments have
made it necessary to redefine and even to
expand the jurisdiction of the military.87
Sounding more like excerpts from a philosophical
treatise, these evaluations of the Nazi saboteurs‘
treatment and trial nonetheless capture the
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complexity and controversy of how to punish
threats to America‘s national security, particularly
in wartime.
Reading carefully, it would be difficult not
to notice a parallel between this rhetoric of more
than six decades past and rhetoric Americans might
hear today in an age of pronounced terrorism. Thus,
stepping back from the microscopic view of the
trial, one discovers its more overarching
significance. The Nazi saboteur trial not only
reasserted America‘s legal stance against malicious
enemy agents; it also laid a foundation for
contemporary political, judicial and international
discourse on an issue that has seemingly found little
resolution since the 1940s: how to legally define
enemies and try them according to increasingly
complex—and yet, ambiguous—legal guidelines.
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On August 8, 1942, saboteurs Edward John
Kerling, Herbert Hans Haupt, Richard Quirlin,
Warren Thiel, Hermann Otto Neubauer, and
Heinrich Harm Hencke were executed by
electrocution. (Georg Dasch and Ernest Berger were
found guilty and eventually deported.) Of the
aftermath, The Chronicler‘s Report for 1942 tersely
noted: ―The bodies were interred at Blue Plains.‖88
On a casual glance, this brief statement
would be the only legacy left by the agents and the
trial by which they were convicted. However,
delving into the fascinating account of their
adventures in America—for a mission whose failure
seemed all too clear from the start—one discovers a
remarkable storyline fit for a novel, but with the
reality of wartime fear, suspicion, and danger. One
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discovers how an unarmed nineteen-year-old high
school student can hamper a nation‘s war effort;
how eight men in a war fought by millions
fomented anxieties shared by numerous American
citizens during wartime; and how these men
inspired legal precedents and bred controversy that
remains to this day. These are the stories hidden
behind the popular images and memories of World
War II, but they are no less important. For behind
the thundering of artillery fire, the masses of
opposing armies in relentless struggle, and the
horrors left in the aftermath of battle lies a war in
the shadows—the quiet war.
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